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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON CLEAN WATER STATE REVOLVING FUNDS: DETERMINANTS
OF STATE LEVERAGING AND MEASUREMENT OF DEBT AFFORDABILITY

Lien T. Nguyen
Old Dominion University, 2022
Director: Dr. John R. Lombard

Leveraging is a popular option among Clean Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRFs).
Most states choose to issue bonds to meet the requirement of the state match contribution, and to
provide additional funding into the pool of funds available for community loan assistance.
Leveraging offers short-term remedies to fill a financial resources gap; however, this raises
concern about any costs associated with leveraging that might negatively influence the
sustainability of CWSRFs in the long run. This dissertation comprises three essays that examine
the different factors that motivate CWSRFs to leverage, and it offers a look at how they measure
their affordability leveraging. Chapter Two borrows the assumptions of pecking order theory to
build CWSRF’s leverage model. It focuses on the internal set of factors, and it analyses how the
entity’s size, profitability, growth, reserve, and risk affect its leveraging. Chapter Three examines
the relationship between leveraging and an external set of indicators, including socioeconomic,
demographic, political, and institutional factors. The findings suggest that, in leveraging, internal
factors appear to be more influential than external ones. The entity’s size and growth (entitybased factors) are found to be significant with both total and annual leveraging, while state
wealth, state politics, and environmental needs also indicate some connection to debt share or
debt per capita. Chapter Four particularly scrutinizes how leveraged states measure their debt
affordability; it replicates the regression method and predicts the future debt service for New

York state. The findings suggest that the regression method can be a good tool for predicting the
debt affordability level for CWSRFs. The predicted values from that method can also serve as a
supplemental reference source for states before they consider additional leveraging.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to explore different sets of factors that influence Clean Water
State Revolving Funds (CWSRF)’s decisions to borrow money through issuing bonds and to
consider how much debt should be incurred to finance investments in wastewater infrastructure.
The research also explores the debt affordability of the CWSRF, as well as its measurement and
projection. The study begins with a general introduction chapter that provides a background of
state capital financing; this is followed by a brief consideration of CWSRF administration and
financial management as an illustration of a financing mechanism for water infrastructure
investment. The chapter also includes the statement of problems and the research purpose,
accompanied by a research outline of the three essays that follow. Model specification, data
description, and proposed analysis are discussed in the following chapters. The chapter
concludes with the overall significance of the research.
State Infrastructure Financing
The United States public infrastructure system faces severe challenges, including
insufficient capacity, deteriorating physical conditions, delayed maintenance, and declining fiscal
resources (Chen, 2015; Chen & Bartle, 2017). Underinvestment continues in most sectors,
including the nation’s highways, bridges, electrical systems, and water infrastructure (Morris,
2017; Mullin & Daley, 2017). According to the American Society of Civil Engineers, the
accumulative estimated funding gap for the nation’s water infrastructure is $105 billion for 20162025 (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2016); on average, the annual shortfall amounts to
tens of billions of dollars (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2016; Copeland & Tiemann,
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2008). For CWSRFs, the total loan assistance provided by CWSRFs during the four years from
2012 to 2015 ($43.4 billion) accounts for only 16 percent of the corresponding estimated
environmental needs collected in 2012 (for four years since then) by the Environmental
Protection Agency ($270.9 billion). Choate and Walter (1983) warned of an impending
infrastructure crisis due to underinvestment. Water infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to
neglect; much of the infrastructure is buried underground or is removed from the public view and
is, thus, easily ignored.
In the United States, infrastructure financing is a shared responsibility across different
levels of government, within which state and local governments are the primary providers and
operators of the core economic infrastructure. This infrastructure covers the vast majority of the
nation’s roads, highways, transit systems, drinking water, and wastewater systems (Chen &
Bartle, 2017). Traditional methods of capital financing fall into three broad categories: pay-asyou-go financing, debt financing, and hybrid system financing. “Pay-as-you-go sources are
comparable to equity financing of capital needs in the private sector” (Ermasova, 2013, p. 100).
While private corporations raise equity financing through issuing stocks, pay-as-you-go
financing for state government comes from taxes and other revenues or capital to which the
taxpayers or citizens have directly contributed. Under this method, federal and state grants
represent the primary funding sources for local infrastructure financing (Chen & Bartle, 2017). A
clean water state revolving fund is a case in point. In contrast to pay-as-you-go or equity
financing, debt financing or pay-as-you-use occurs when the state government or a private firm
borrows capital and incurs debt to finance capital projects and acquisitions. State agencies can
acquire debt financing through different resources, such as through the use of treasury loans,
revenue bonds, general obligation, bond anticipation notes, inter-fund borrowing, revenue notes,
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and tax-exempt commercial paper (Ermasova, 2013). The municipal bond market, in which more
than one million bonds are backed by specific revenue streams and are issued by more than
50,000 units of governments (Marlowe, 2015), plays a crucial role in state and local capital
financing (Chen & Bartle, 2017).
The conventional wisdom of state public finance suggests that current expenditure should
be financed by current revenues, while capital expenditures may be financed by borrowing
funds. The use of debt financing for capital infrastructure is theoretically justified by the
“benefits received” principle, sometimes called the matching principle, or by inter-period equity.
That is, capital expenditures such as roads, highways, public buildings, water infrastructure, and
other infrastructure (typically exceeding 20 to 30 years) will benefit both current and future
taxpayers. Therefore, the cost of such public investments should be borne by both groups
(Denison, Hackbart, & Moody, 2006; Hackbart, Sapp, & Hur, 2004). Marlowe (2015) reports
that about 90% of state and local capital spending is financed by debt. Also, benefit matching has
the added advantages of smoothing tax revenues and reducing volatility in the tax rates (Denison,
2002).
Given the fiscal constraints, in addition to traditional funding sources and financing
methods, several alternative mechanisms of financing innovations have been proposed in order
to try to bridge public infrastructure financing gaps. Chen and Bartle (2017) classify them into
three main categories: (1) new funding sources through new taxes and value capture; (2) new
financing mechanisms such as new credit assistance tools (including state revolving funds),
alternative bonds, and debt financing tools (green bonds, social impact bonds); and (3) new
financial arrangements such as public-private partnerships, infrastructure investment funds, and
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crowdfunding (p.14). Among these innovations, this research will focus on state revolving funds
(SRFs), one of the new credit assistance tools in the second category.
Clean Water State Revolving Fund
State revolving funds (SRFs) are state-run entities capitalized by federal funds and state
matching funds that offer various forms of financing, typically direct loans at low-interest rates,
to local governments and other public and private entities for infrastructure projects. In other
words, SRFs function as environmental infrastructure banks; they provide low-interest loans to
eligible recipients for water infrastructure projects (EPA, 2021). Loan repayments revolve back
into the pool of funds to fund other new local eligible projects; thus, they are aptly named
“revolving funds” (Chen, 2016). Currently, there are two groups of SRFs: environmental and
transportation. The environmental SRFs include Clean Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRFs)
and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds (DWSRFs), both of which are capitalized by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s capitalization grants and require a minimum 20
percent match from state funds. Congress authorizes states to transfer funds between the DWSRF
and CWSRF in order to maximize the efficiency of their infrastructure funding program, such as
increasing fund availability where they need the most, enhancing bond rating, and lowering
borrowing costs. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the transfer and crosscollateralization of these two programs similarly (Government Publishing Office, 2000).
The transportation SRF is a state infrastructure bank (SIB). Like the environmental SRFs,
SIBs also receive federal transportation aid and state-matching funds as seed capitalization funds
to start; then, they offer low-interest loans and non-grant forms of credit enhancement for state
and local transportation projects. Among these two groups, environmental SRFs are currently
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utilized by all of the states and by Puerto Rico, while many SIBs are inactive and underutilized
(Chen & Bartle, 2017).
The CWSRF was created in 1987 when the Water Quality Act (WQA) of 1987 was
passed, and it authorized the State Water Pollution Control Revolving Funds. The WQA was to
give states more control and discretion in water quality funding – to reduce the role of the
national government (Morris, 2022). These 1987 amendments altered federal funding
arrangements from direct grants made to municipalities to capitalized state loans; the intent was
to provide long-term funding for water quality and wastewater construction activities. The
federal government provides funds through annual appropriations under a state-by-state
allocation formula contained in the Act itself (Copeland, 2014). Despite the formal
authorization’s expiration in FY1994, the pressure to extend federal funding has continued,
partly since the funding needs have remained high, as estimated by EPA. Congress has continued
to appropriate funds and has delayed the anticipated shift to full state funding responsibility.
Appropriations for the CWSRF program through fiscal year 2019 have totaled nearly $45.2
billion; this represents the largest nonmilitary public works program since the Interstate Highway
System (Copeland, 2012).
States are responsible for the operation of CWSRFs. The program offers states significant
flexibility in setting priorities and in administering CWSRF dollars. States may use their CWSRF
resources to provide several types of loans for treatment plants and sewer systems, stormwater,
energy conservation, water conservation, nonpoint sources, and federally designated estuaries,
among other related uses. States may customize their loan terms (interest rates, repayment
periods). And states can decide to leverage their funds (raising additional funds by issuing bonds
using program funds as security), including matching funds (Copeland, 2014, p. 3). States can
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also contribute additional capitalized funding and additional non-capitalized funding beyond the
required 20 percent match. In addition to offering such flexibility, CWSRF is subjected to many
requirements. States can use the money for different loans, but they must agree to use SRF
monies first to ensure that wastewater treatment facilities comply with the CWA’s deadlines,
goals, and requirements. States can adopt certain financial policies, such as leveraging; principal
forgiveness, however, is required to maintain the Fund balances available in perpetuity (CWSRF
Regulations Section 35.3115) (EPA, 2018).
States often define their CWRSF programs as ongoing enterprise funds under the
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) definition of funds (EPA, 2019).
“Enterprise funds are established to account for operations that are financed and operated in a
manner similar to private business enterprise” (EPA, 2018, p.52). CWSRFs must comply with
financial reporting standards established by GASB Statement No. 34 (Basic Financial Statements
– and Management’s Discussion and Analysis – for State and Local Governments) (EPA, 2018).
CWSRFs are also subjected to the Single Audit Act and Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) and undergo independent financial audits of their CWSRF’s financial
statements (Government Accountability Office, 2006).
Concerning leveraging, states primarily use one of two basic approaches: the reserve
method or the cash-flow method (or blended rate) (Bunch, 2008; EPA, 2018). Under the reserve
fund option, states set aside and deposit federal capital grants and state matching funds into a
reserve fund which is pledged to secure the bonds. These reserve funds usually account for 40 to
60 percent of the outstanding bonds. They act as security for the bond, and they are invested to
produce interest earnings to pay off bond debt service later. Under cash-flow leveraging, the
reserve fund is often about 10 percent of bonds outstanding, since the states recognize that a high
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reserve is no longer needed in their case, due to the program’s high cash flow, and perfect credit
history of bond repayment, and loan repayment (EPA, 2018, p.38). There are two separate pools
of funds in cash-flow leveraging: the federal and state capitalization and the leveraged bond
proceeds; accordingly, there are direct loans and leveraged loans. The net interest cost to the
locality is a blend of the interest rates on two loans (Bunch, 2008). Recently, states have also
used direct loans or a combination of both reserve funds and direct loans as collateral for
borrowing in the public bond market (Copeland, 2014).
Leveraging serves two purposes: leveraging for state matches and leveraging for
additional funding. There are two types of bonds used: general obligation (GO) bonds and
revenue bonds. The GO bond is supported by the state’s full faith and credit and taxing authority;
however, its debt service (bond principal and bond interest) can be sourced either from the state
government, using the general fund, or from the CWSRF, using interest earnings. The revenue
bond is issued and retired by the CWSRF (EPA, 2018). Most of CWSRF bonds issued are
revenue bonds; their debt services are thus backed by CWSRF’s own revenues. Debt services are
paid from the following combined sources: from loan principal and interest repayments, from
interest earnings on the debt service reserve funds, and from other sources (e.g., subsidy
payments provided by states). There is a total of about $50.6 billion (including the state match
bonds) in leveraged bonds issued during the study period, of which $22.3 billion remained
outstanding at the end of the 2019 reporting period, compared to about a cumulative federal and
state appropriation of $54.2 billion during the same period1.

1
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To fulfill the 20 percent matching requirement, states may contribute through
appropriation, local match, non-program income, or state match bonds. States are required to
describe their source of matching funds in their federal grant application. The matching funds
must be deposited on or before the cash withdrawal date. Most wastewater and drinking water
SRF programs have used bonds at some time to obtain state matches. For the CWSRF program,
24 states (out of 51) have issued bonds for-state matches. There are two types of state match
bonds used: general obligation (GO) bonds and revenue bonds (EPA, 2018). Until 2019, the state
match totaled up to $8.5 billion (nominal value). Cash and appropriation account for 29 percent,
GO bond for 39 percent, revenue bond for 20 percent, and the remaining 12 percent belong to
other sources2. Since the states borrow to meet the state match requirement, the dollars used to
repay for matching bond interests and principal reduce the financial resources of CWSRF.
Several states, such as Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Montana, have contributed
more than the required 20 percent match in some years.
Loan terms and loan interests are two critical factors of the program, since they both need
to make the program appealing and low-cost, but they also ensure the maximization of the rate of
return on their funds. In other words, they need to ensure financial objectives, but they also need
to meet the program objectives. States rely on several criteria to set loan terms. They also offer
different loan terms for different types of projects such as green infrastructure, nonpoint source
pollution control, or loans to financially disadvantaged communities. The loan terms are usually
between 20 to 30 years. Prior to 2014, the loan term was capped at 20 years. However, following
the adoption of a provision in the Water Resources Re-investment and Development Act
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(WRRDA) of 2014, CWSRF loans may be issued for up to 30 years or the project’s useful life
(Morris, 2022). The interest earnings are the largest source of cash inflow into the program, and
the CWSRF interest rate subsidy (interest from investment fund) is a factor that influences the
state’s entity to decide the loan interest rate. The CWSRF section 35.3120 requires that “CWSRF
loan interest rates be between zero percent and the market rate, as determined by the states. EPA
does not define market rate, although many states use the 20-year General Obligation Bond
Buyer Index. Historically, CWSRF interest rates have averaged approximately half the market
rate” (EPA, 2018, p.16).
Besides loan interest, interest earnings from cash and investments held by the CWSRF
are the next most important area of cash inflows. EPA reports that the investment funds are
managed by the state Treasurer or the Investment Board (in 60 percent of the states). In the
remaining 40 percent of the states, the CWSRF Administrators are responsible for managing
investment funds, following the incorporated statutory investment policies and procedures.
CWSRF funds are usually invested in conservative investments, such as US Treasuries, and on a
short-term basis. The yield on investment return is the market rate; leveraged states appear to
generate higher earnings than direct loan states (EPA, 2018).
In addition to low loan interest, CWSRFs can also provide additional subsidies to
borrowers in the form of principal forgiveness, negative interest, and grants, starting from 2010.
Since 2014, the CWSRF statute has allowed states to use a portion of their capitalization amount
for additional subsidiaries for states with an appropriation greater than $1 billion. States decide
which and how projects will be selected for additional subsidy. Some states base their decisions
on affordability metrics to distribute subsidies, while others allocate subsidies for high-priority
water quality or public health projects (EPA, 2018).
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The EPA collects data annually from the states’ CWSRF programs to document program
progress and to account for the use of federal funds from 1988 to the present; this information is
stored in the CWSRF National Information Management System (NIMS). NIMS data is, thus,
comprehensive and consistently comparable among states. The NIMS database offers both
annual and cumulative data – a variety of indicators and metrics that help tell a story about an
CWSRF’s financial performance. The EPA contends that the cumulative figures are typically
more informative and recommends utilizing them in the analysis because of the year-to-year
variations (annual data) in program cash flows. The EPA SRF Fund Management Handbook also
provides comprehensive information about the CWSRF and DWSRF programs.
Statement of Problem and Significance of the Study
Over thirty years of CWSRF implementation, states, at their discretion, have reported
different preferences over financing decisions for the state contribution as well as for additional
contributions. Many states use a mix of cash and bonds for funding; some states only use cash or
appropriations, while others consistently choose bonds. In particular, leveraging has been
reported as fluctuating since the inception of the WQA; some states engage in aggressive
leveraging, while others consider a safer level of leveraging (Bunch, 2008; Travis, Morris, &
Morris, 2004). On the one hand, leveraging increases the pool of available funds for project
lending, but, in the long run, it can deplete a CWSRF, since the state borrows at market rates but
makes loans at below-market rates (Holcombe, 1992). Thus, when using leveraging, states are
accepting a trade-off between providing more benefits sooner and possibly damaging the longrun viability of the program (Holcombe, 1992). States that issue leverage bonds confront the
challenge of structuring the CWSRF so that it allows the state to pay debt service on the bonds
while maintaining reasonable interest rates on the CWSRF loans (Bunch, 2008). Leveraged
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states also offer higher mean loan interest (2.9 percent) compared to non-leveraged states (2.3%)
in 2001 (Bunch, 2008). In addition, borrowing for the state match may impact the program in the
long-term because loan interest earnings, which would have otherwise remained with the
CWSRF, are lost in order to repay the match bond principal and interest. There is actually no
matching fund at the end of the bond repayment, since the leveraged state match has already
been repaid. The CWSRF program is left with the original federal grant plus accumulated net
earnings at the end (EPA, 2018). However, due to the significant cash flow in the CWSRFs, the
impact of the state match bond likely outweighs the impact of the state’s not receiving the capital
grant.
This research seeks to broaden the understanding of CWSRF leveraging among states.
The study is structured into three essays, and it attempts to find answers to the following
questions: what factors affect a state’s choice to leverage; the level of leveraging; and how do
states measure their leveraging or debt affordability? While the first two essays examine
different sets of factors that explain a state’s choice of using debt versus equity and its debt level,
the third essay investigates states with leveraging, in order to discover their ability for debt
repayment as well as to consider factors that influence such CWSRFs’ debt affordability.
The first essay is entitled “Pecking Order Theory: Does it Explain the Capital Structure of
the Clean Water State Revolving Fund?” By borrowing the pecking order theory for
infrastructure investment from the private sector, this essay attempts to test whether the pecking
order theory applies to the public sector by using the example of the CWSRF and then by
investigating its potential explanatory power. In particular, the essay analyzes internal or entitybased factors, including profitability, size, growth, tangibility, and risks, in order to determine
their relationship with a CWSRF’s debt decision and the debt level.
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The second essay, entitled “Leveraging in Clean Water State Revolving Fund, Evidence
from External Factors”, examines the set of external factors that include economic and
demographic factors, environmental needs, state politics, institutional factors, and their
relationship to a state’s choice of debt financing and its debt level.
The final essay, entitled “An Exploratory Study of CWSRF’s Debt Affordability and its
Measurement,” scrutinizes the CWSRF’s debt capacity or affordability. The essay provides an
analysis of debt affordability measurement that uses the debt service-to-revenue ratio (annual
debt service as a percentage of total revenue) among leveraging states. The paper then examines
the relationship between revenue-raising factors (federal capitalization, state match, other state
grants, earning on investment, loan interests), loan principal repayment, weighted loan interest
rate, and other factors (state personal income, population) with the annual debt service level,
respectively. Then, it uses historical data about these independent variables to predict the future
value of the debt service level.
To conclude the study, the findings from each essay are reviewed and discussed in the
context of CWSRF leveraging. The policy implications of the findings are also discussed, and
suggestions for possible future research on the overarching topic of CWSRF leveraging and
financial sustainability in CWSRFs are offered.
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CHAPTER 2
PECKING ORDER THEORY: DOES IT EXPLAIN THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF
THE CLEAN WATER STATE REVOLVING FUND?
Introduction
“Leveraging is a valuable option for states with substantially more demand than they
have funds available” (EPA, 2018, p. 37). However, effective use of leveraging requires careful
planning and financial management. Whether states should use debt or equity to contribute to a
20 percent state match and additional funding to the Clean Water State Revolving Fund
(CWSRF), as well as the way in which leveraging influences the development and sustainability
of the program, should be considered. While leveraging would bring more financial resources to
the pools of funding that provide greater project assistance, it also incurs risks since the CWSRF
borrows at the market interest rate but provides loans to communities at a low-interest rate (often
half of that market rate). No leveraging, or insufficient leveraging, would reduce the state’s
opportunity to have more funds available for loans. At the same time, overleveraging would
expose CWSRF to the risk of unsustainability and depletion.
The capital structure and the financing decisions of a private firm have been widely
researched; however, research on not-for-profits (nonprofits and the public sector) is less
prevalent, and the current literature draws extensively (theoretically and empirically) on the forprofit literature. Pecking order theory, a critical theory in the field, offers explanations for
financing decisions in private organizations. It suggests that managers prefer internal funds to
external borrowing; debt is a superior choice to equity if external borrowing is needed. In other
words, there is a financing hierarchy: retained earnings, debt, and then equity (Frank & Goyal,
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2009). Despite the differences between the for-profit and the not-for-profit sectors, the pecking
order theory is found to be applicable to nonprofit organizations (Calabrese, 2011) and to quasigovernment entities (Sonola, 2018).
CWSRF, a state-run entity – and “an enterprise fund” – is a self-supporting government
fund that has its operations financed and operated like a private business enterprise (EPA, 2018,
p.52). Like private and nonprofit organizations, a CWSRF can finance its operation and capital
investment through internal funds (accumulated profit and federal capitalization grants), external
funds (debt), or some combination of the two. While, in nonprofits, private capital structure
theories have been tested, there is a lack of scholarly research pertaining to the public authorities.
The purpose of this essay is to expand the application of the pecking order theory to the public
sector by studying the capital structure and the debt use of CWSRFs. The essay analyzes the
factors that determine the leveraging decisions, as well as leveraging scale, of CWSRF. The
following research questions are answered in this study: What are the leverage profiles of
CWSRF from 1990 to 2019, and how do leverage profiles vary by year? What is the relationship
of the determinants identified in the private sector to the capital structure of CWSRF? Do the
study’s findings provide empirical support for the pecking order theory? And what are other
determinants of the capital structure of CWSRF?
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: the next section presents a review of
the literature and then a model for CWSRF’s leverage, as well as the research hypothesis, design,
and methodology. The final section presents the results and the findings, as well as a summary of
the study, the implications and contributions, and the directions for future research.
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Literature Review
This section reviews the determinants of capital structure and financing decisions in
corporate finance. It then offers a more in-depth investigation of its relevance to the nonprofit
and public sectors.
The capital structure can be referred to as the liability side of a balance sheet – the side
where capital structure decisions involve setting the mix of equity and debt financing (Gapenski,
1994). The term “leverage” is used to operationalize between debt and equity. Sonola (2018)
summarizes leverage definitions that have been commonly used in the not-for-profit and forprofit sectors. Leverage can be a ratio of total debt to total assets, total liabilities to total assets,
or long-term debt to total assets. Accordingly, “a highly leveraged profile is that of a firm with a
high concentration of debt in its capital structure, while an unleveraged firm has no debt in its
capital structure” (Sonola, 2018, p. 10).
Despite such similar measurement of the leverage ratio, there is a fundamental legal
distinction between a for-profit and a not-for-profit enterprise: nonprofit firms have no owners,
have restrictions on how they can use donated assets, “are not subjected to involuntary
bankruptcy”, and can issue tax-exempt bonds (Bowman, 2002, p. 294). These differences lead to
the distinctive characteristics of equity components. While a private firm’s equity comprises
stocks and paid-in capital, the equity of a nonprofit organization consists of contributions,
subsidies, and profits/losses, which are to be retained to the non-distribution constraint (Jegers &
Verschueren, 2006, p. 294). In addition, for-profit organizations, taxable entities can take
advantage of the tax-exempt feature (such as the interest expense on outstanding debt being taxdeductible) and thus have more incentives to use debt. In contrast, not-for-profit organizations,
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which are non-taxable entities, have relatively lower borrowing rates because of their tax-exempt
bond issuance (Sonola, 2018, p. 10).
Capital Structure Theories - Pecking Order Theory and its Relevance to the Not-for-Profit
Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s irrelevance proposition theorem is the initial position for
all modern treatments of capital structure theories (Frydenberg, 2011). In a world of perfect
market assumptions, “with no taxes, no brokerage costs, no bankruptcy costs, and riskless debt,
the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure” (Modigliani & Miller, 1958 as cited by
Sonola, 2018, p.13); a firm’s value does not depend on how much equity and debt the firm uses.
However, in the real world, the absence of these assumptions gives reasons why capital structure
is relevant to a firm’s value. Successively, the trade-off and pecking order theories have emerged
as dominant theories in the for-profit and nonprofit literature (Sonola, 2018). While the trade-off
theory’s focus is the optimal capital structure or a target ratio (set by balancing the benefits and
costs associated with debts) which firms gradually move toward, the pecking order theory offers
a distinction between internal and external capital. Despite empirical evidence of these theories
in not-for-profit firms, “there is minimal consensus on how other not-for-profit firms choose
their capital structure” (Sonola, 2018, p. 3)
Pecking order theory posits that firms prefer internal to external financing and debt-toequity if external funds are needed (Myers, 1984). The reasoning behind such ordering originates
from the information asymmetry between managers and new capital (debt or equity) providers
and the transactional costs from external sources of financing (Myers & Majluf, 1984).
Compared to outsider investors, firm managers are assumed to possess better information about
the actual value of a firm’s assets and growth opportunities. Thus, managers are only willing to
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sell equity when the firm is overvalued, while undervalued managers seek to capture all value by
not selling equity. An announcement about raising new equity sends a signal to outsiders that the
firm is overvalued, and this may trigger an adverse reaction from new investors to discount the
value of the shares as compensation for the assumption of an overvalued firm (Myers & Majluf,
1984; Sonola, 2018) or to discourage new investors from buying the shares (Sawant, 2010).
Firms, therefore, prefer internal financing to external financing. If internal funding is not
available, firms prefer to issue debt instead of equity because debt issuance is interpreted as a
positive signal – that the firm is confident about future growth opportunities. A new equity
option is only utilized when the firm is highly leveraged and or “additional debt is likely to cause
the risk of financial distress to the firm” (Sawant, 2010, p. 75).
To apply the pecking order theory to the not-for-profit sector, the definition of internal
and external funds should also be identified in the relevant not-for-profit setting. For a national
capital structure, taxes, debts, and seigniorage (printing money) are three different sources of
financing for government expenditures. They are, respectively, similar to the internal funds,
debts, and equity of corporate financing (Miglo, 2018). For instance, internal funds and taxes
depend on the firm’s efficiency or that of the government. There are many similarities between
the shares issued by the corporations and the money printed by the government (Bolton &
Huang, 2017), among them that both are residual claims, that their amount of circulation depends
on the issuers’ decisions, and that their real value depends on the firm’s success as well as on the
efficiency of the economy. Despite such similarities between the government and corporations’
financing sources, formal differences exist (e.g., money printed does not provide any dividends
or votes while shares do). For a firm capital structure, nonprofit firms do not issue common
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stock; hence, their external financing is limited to borrowing, and their internal financing is
generated from an accumulation of operating earnings (Sonola, 2018).
This essay focuses on the pecking order theory only for several reasons. Contrary to the
trade-off theory, which targets an optimal capital structure, the pecking order theory contends
that more profitable firms have more internal funds available; thus, they likely borrow less,
whereas less profitable firms need external funding and subsequently accumulate debt (Myers,
1984; Sonola, 2018). Also, as pointed out by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), the pecking order
explains much more of the time-series variance in actual debt ratios than the target adjustment
model based on the static trade-off theory. This is relevant to the purposes of this essay; instead
of targeting an optimal structure, this essay aims to investigate the variance in CWSRF’s
leveraging among states. In addition, scholars have documented empirical evidence of the
pecking order theory relevant to the capital structure of nonprofits (Jegers & Verschueren, 2006).
Specifically, Calabrese (2011) tested the application of both the pecking order theory and the
trade-off theory to nonprofits and concluded that the use of the pecking order theory was more
applicable to nonprofit organizations.
Determinants of Capital Structure in the Corporate Sector
Scholars conduct reviews of corporations’ capital structure and summarize various
determinants of leveraging in private firms. They assess each determinant’s reliability and
recommend the most reliable essential factors. For the most part, this essay is based on Sonola
(2018)’s and Frank and Goyal (2009)’s reviews. Following assumptions of the pecking order
theory and the trade-off theory, these authors identify a model of leveraging and include seven
firm attributes as the critical determinants of leverage. These include profitability, size, the
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tangibility of assets, the age of the plant and property, growth, liquidity, and risks. For CWSRFs,
the age and liquidity factors are excluded since all CWSRFs started at the same time, and given
the high cashflow nature of CWSRFs, they are likely exposed to the minimal risk of liquidity.
Following is a brief consideration of the five firm attributes relevant to this essay.
Profitability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of operating earnings to total assets.
The preference for internal funds to external funds in the pecking order theory suggests a
negative relationship between leverage and profitability. It means that more profitable firms
become less leveraged over time (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Most empirical studies find a negative
relationship between leverage and profitability, a relationship that is consistent with the pecking
order theory (Bessler, Drobetz, & Kazemieh, 2011; Sonola, 2018).
Tangibility (Leverage and Nature of Assets). Tangibility refers to the availability of
collateral to secure debt obligations; this is typically measured by considering the ratio of fixed
assets to total assets (Sonola, 2018). Under the pecking order theory, tangibility is ambiguous,
and it can be negative or positive with leverage. On the one hand, “low information asymmetry
associated with tangible assets makes equity issuances less costly; thus, leverage ratios should be
lower for firms with higher tangibility” (Frank & Goyal, 2009, p. 9). On the other hand,
tangibility increases adverse selection (sellers have more information than buyers) when
information asymmetry associated with assets occurs. It results in higher debt (Frank & Goyal,
2009). Tangibility can also be a proxy for different economic forces, explaining its ambiguity
under the pecking order theory (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Most studies have found a positive
relationship between tangibility and leverage, not supporting the pecking order theory (Sonola,
2018).
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Firm Size. The pecking order theory predicts an inverse relationship between leverage
and firm size and between leverage and firm age. Large firms are better known, usually build
more internal funds over time, and resort to a relatively lower use of debt as external financing
(Frank & Goyal, 2009; Sonola, 2018; Titman & Wessels, 1988). A log of assets or a log of
revenues is used to measure firm size. Titman and Wessels (1988) found a negative relationship;
however, many others did not find supporting evidence for the pecking order theory. Instead,
they found an opposite relation in that firm size was positively associated with leverage.
Growth. Under the pecking order theory’s prediction, firms with more growth or
investment accumulate more debt over time since internal resources will not be enough to
finance their growth (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Therefore, growth opportunities and leveraging
are positively related under the pecking order theory (Frank & Goyal, 2009).
Volatility/Risk. The pecking order theory predicts a negative relationship between
business risk and leveraging because firms with more volatile cash flows try to accumulate cash
or pay off debt during very profitable years to prevent under-investment in the future (Frank &
Goyal, 2009; Sonola, 2018).
Capital Structure on the Nonprofit
The empirical research on capital structure of nonprofit organizations has been limited to
the health care industry, such as hospitals (Trussel, 2012), and education such as universities
(Denison, Fowles, & Moody, 2014). Recently, studies have focused on the nonprofit sector as a
whole (Smith, 2012). According to Sonola (2018), the findings are mixed, with some supporting
the use of the pecking order theory in nonprofits (such as profitability, growth, and risk), while
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the size variable provides a mixed result. Tangibility does not support the prediction of the
pecking order theory. Below is a brief consideration of each factor.
The profitability factor, which is predicted to negatively affect leverage, primarily
follows the pecking order theory (Calabrese, 2011; Jegers & Verschueren, 2006; Smith, 2010;
Smith, 2012; Szymańska, Van Puyvelde, & Jegers, 2015), as the findings in the nonprofit
literature suggest that more profitable organizations “will retain funds and resort less to the use
of debt to fund investments” (Sonola, 2018, p. 51). Nonprofits likely do not want to use up all of
their internal funds despite the preference for internal financing over external financing. Still,
they seek to maintain some amount of internal capital to lower the cost of not having the capital
for future expansion, which Calabrese (2011) considers a modified pecking order theory for the
nonprofit.
“The size of an organization is the most common factor identified across all of the
nonprofit studies reviewed” (Sonola, 2018, p.50). Size is mainly defined as the log of total assets
and, in some cases, as the log of revenue (Smith, 2012; Trussel, 2012). Some studies have found
a significant negative relationship between size and leveraging, supporting the pecking order
theory (Calabrese, 2011; Jegers, 2011; Jegers & Verschueren, 2006; Szymańska et al., 2015).
However, there is also evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship between
organization size and leveraging, which aligns with the for-profit literature (Smith, 2012).
The nonprofit literature defines tangibility as the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets.
The findings consistently indicate a positive statistical relationship with leveraging; this is
consistent with most empirical studies in the for-profit literature, but it is inconsistent with
pecking order theory. The growth variable is commonly defined as the growth rate in revenue or
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assets. Scholars found a statistically significant positive relationship between growth and
leverage, which is in line with both the pecking order theory and the empirical evidence in the
for-profit sector (Bowman, 2002; Smith, 2012).
A risk factor is often defined as the volatility (standard deviation) of return on assets, and
empirical evidence shows a statistically significant negative relationship between leverage and
risk (Bowman, 2002). Earning volatility is believed to reduce access to tax-exempt debt. This
risk factor follows the pecking order theory’s prediction.
Sonola (2018) also noted other industry-specific capital structure determining factors that
have been identified in the literature, including the payer mix (the ratio of Medicaid and
Medicare revenues to total revenues) as an essential variable for hospitals, enrollment growth as
a measure of growth for universities (Denison et al., 2014), and endowment, a source of revenue
which has been found to have a negative relationship with leverage (Bowman, 2002; Calabrese,
2011; Smith, 2012).
Review of Empirical Studies in the Public Sector
There is limited research on capital structure and the factors affecting borrowing for
public authorities, special entities, and government agencies. Sonola (2018) was the first to
examine the capital structure of water, power, or transportation enterprises, which are quasigovernment entities that provide discrete services to millions of people annually. The author tests
both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory by using four debt ratios as dependent
variables and seven independent variables, including profitability, size, asset tangibility,
organization age, growth, liquidity, and risk. The secondary data is from the CreditScope
database, covering 2000-2015; qualitative data were obtained from interviews of key financial

23
decision-makers from these enterprises. The findings show mixed support for the pecking order
and for trade-off theories. While the negative relationship between leverage and profitability
supports the pecking order theory, the positive relationship between size and leverage supports
the trade-off theory. The current study extends Sonola (2018)’s analysis to CWSRFs, state-run
entities.
The pecking order theory has been tested in a few studies that research the capital
structure of a national government. However, these articles only examine whether or not the
federal government should use internal or external financing; they do not investigate the factors
that might affect such a decision. Miglo (2018)’s model predicts that issuing money is more
sensitive to information asymmetry (when the government has more information about the
economy than potential providers of funds) than to borrowing; so, debt is preferred to
seigniorage. Also, since taxes are not subject to asymmetric information, they should be
preferred to debt. The implication of the pecking order theory for government finance suggests
that countries with high expected GDP values should use taxes as much as possible for financing.
This inference is also consistent with the observation that taxes usually account for 70 percent to
90 percent of the government spending, followed by debt and seigniorage (Miglo, 2018).
Model Specification, Research Hypothesis, and Data
CWSRF Leverage Model
The model is designed to test a set of factors (including private sector identified
determinants and specific CWSRF determinants) and their relationship with the capital structure
of CWSRFs. Though CWSRFs are state-run entities, they are classified under enterprise funds
that are used to report activity for which a fee is charged to external users for goods and services.
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For instance, CWSRFs offer direct loans (financial services) for communities to build municipal
wastewater treatment plants; the communities then pay back the interests as a fee for a loan.
CWSRFs are expected to be self-sustaining even when federal appropriation ends. Since
CWSRFs operate like private business enterprises, private sector theory, such as pecking order
theory, would be applicable to CWSRFs. However, CWSRFs also have to meet specific
requirements and have to achieve other targets mandated by the federal government, such as
providing loans with low interest for specifically targeted communities and offering principal
forgiveness. Thus, besides the five factors borrowed and adapted from the private sector, this
essay also includes several variables from CWSRF itself, which may also influence state
leveraging decisions.
The model for leveraging of CWSRFs is presented below:
Leverageit =ϕLeverageit-1 +β1 Profitabilityit +β2 Sizeit +β3 Growthit +β4 Tangibilityit +β5 Riskit
+β6 WAIRLit +β7 FROIit +μi +dt + εit
Where 𝜀 is the error term, represents unobserved state-specific effects, and stands for
time fixed effects. Leverage of state i at year t is measured in two ways: the outstanding debt
(measured as a stock concept) and new debt issued (measured as a flow concept). The lagged
leverage is included as a regressor. Among the predictors, Profitability, Size, Growth,
Tangibility, and Risk are five independent factors drawn from pecking order theory literature.
Loan Interest and Federal Return on Investment (FROI) are internal CWSRF factors. (Age
determinants are not included in the model because these funds have a similar starting date;
liquidity is also not included because of the assumption that CWSRF is high cash flow). The
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dependent and the independent variables are all financial ratios calculated or available from the
CWSRF National Information Management System (NIMS).
Different from private corporations (stocks and paid-in capital) and nonprofit
organizations (contributions), the equity component of CWSRFs (presented as net assets on the
balance sheet) mainly comprises federal capitalization, state match contributions, transfers from
other SRFs, retained earnings, and other net assets. This essay uses cumulative Contributed
Capital and cumulative Retained Earnings for the equity component, including cumulative
federal grants and state match, transfer from other SRF (the Drinking Water SRF), and Retained
Earnings, the significant parts of the equity component, instead. Total leveraged bonds
outstanding are used for the total liabilities component because the total leverage (match bond
outstanding and leveraged bond outstanding) accounts for the majority of CWSRF’s total
liabilities. Thus, this essay treats total cumulative Contributed Capital, Retained Earnings plus
Total Bond Leveraged Outstanding as the Total Assets of CWSRFs.
Following capital structure literature, this essay defines the Total Leverage as the Total
Bond Issued Outstanding as a percentage of Total Assets and the New (Annual) Leverage as the
Annual Bond Issued as a percentage of Total Assets. These ratios will provide insight into the
CWSRF’s capital structure in both aspects: the stock/level of debt at the reporting date and
annual flows of new debt. These measurement proxies of debt ratio also follow the practice of
state debt financing, which analyzes both outstanding debts – stock of debt and new debt issued
– and the flow of debt over time (Greer & Denison, 2016). Table A.1 in Appendix A provides a
list of NIMS data codes for each data item used in this essay. The details of two dependent
variables total leverage and new leverage presented in Table 2.1 below.
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Table 2.1
Dependent Variables
Dependent
Variables

Total
Leverage
(TL)
New
Leverage
(NL)

Definition/Measurement and Data Source (NIMS)
Bond Leveraged Outstanding as a percentage of Total Assets:
Leveraged Bond Outstanding+Match Bond Oustanding
Total Assets
Annual Bond Leveraged as a percentage of Total Assets:
Annual Gross Leveraged Bonds Issued+Annual Match Bond Issued
Total Assets

Table 2.2 below summarizes all the study’s independent variables and the expected
direction of the variable’s relationship with leverage. A detailed description of the formula for
each independent variable follows.
Table 2.2
Independent Variables Used in Analysis
Variable
Name

Definition/measurement

Profitability

This is the ratio of Annual Operating Net as a
percent of Total Assets, in which “Operating
Net” is a measure of the growth of the fund from
operating activities prior to the addition of
capitalization grants, match, and leveraged
bonds. It is computed in this way: Loan Interest
plus Investment Interest minus Match Bond
Repaid minus Bond Interest Expense (EPA,
2018, p.62).

Expected Sign

CWSRFs that have more
profits tend to have lower
leverage.
Negative (-)
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Table 2.2 Continued
Variable
Name

Profitability

Definition/measurement

Expected Sign

In the context of CWSRF (with tax-exempt
and subsidy or sharing of administrative
costs), the annual operating net is exactly the
same as the annual retaining earnings in line
NIMS 318.
Annual Operating Net (Retained Earnings)
Total Assets

Weighted
Average
Interest Rate
on Loans

This is the weighted average of the interest
rate charged on CWSRF assistance provided
during the reporting period. (NIMS 240)

(WAIRLCWSRF
profitability
factor)

The higher loan interest rate
charged would result in a
higher operating net leading to
higher profitability. Similar to
the profitability variable, it is
assumed that the higher
WAIRL being set, the lower
the debt level will be.
Negative (-)

Size

Log of Total Assets
Log of (Leveraged Bond Outstanding +
Match Bond Outstanding + Cumulative
Federal Contribution + Cumulative State
Contribution + Cumulative Retained
Earnings)

Growth

Annual Percent Change in Total Assets
Total Assett -Total Assett-1
Total Assett-1

States with larger total assets
usually have an opportunity to
retain earnings. Thus, a larger
CWSRF uses less debt.
Negative (-)
CWSRFs with more
investments should
accumulate more debt over
time, since an internal
resource will not be enough to
finance the growth. Thus, the
pecking order theory
positively relates growth
opportunities and leverage.
Positive (+)
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Table 2.2 Continued
Variable
Name
Federal
return on
investment
(FROI)
(CWSRF
growth
factor)

Definition/measurement

Expected Sign

The federal return on investment (NIMS 307)
reflects how successful SRF programs have been
at turning capitalization grants into loans that
revolve and earn interest (EPA, 2018, p.62). This
is calculated as the Cumulative Project (Loan)
Assistance Disbursed as a percentage of
Cumulative Outlay (Contributed Capitalization).
Nationally, the Federal Return on Investment was
272 percent for the CWSRF in 2017, indicating
that $1 of federal funds invested in the program
resulted in $2.72 in projects in the CWSRF.

FROI is an important
growth indicator of
CWSRFs measuring the
revolving perspective of
each federal dollar
invested. The higher
utilization or expansion of
federal contributions may
reduce the need for more
debts. FROI and
leveraging would be
negatively related.
Negative (-)

Debt Service
Reserve
Ratio
(DSRR)

Tangibility is often a ratio of fixed assets to total
assets. Since CWSRFs have no relevant fixed
assets as private enterprises do, a reserve fund is
set aside to secure the debt obligation. The debt
service reserve, as a percent of the bond
outstanding, is used to measure the asset
tangibility variable in this essay. “This is an
indicator of the size of the debt service reserve
fund. A reserve fund leveraged state will have a
high percentage for this measure. A cash flow
leveraged program will have closer to 10 percent
of outstanding debt in reserves. An increasing
number of states have no debt service reserve due
to high cash flows” (EPA, 2018, p.63).

Since the reserve
information and other
financial information of
CWSRF are fully public
or it is likely to have low
information asymmetry, in
line with pecking order
theory, the debt service
reserve ratio is
hypothesized to be
negative with leveraging.
Negative (-)

Cumulative Debt Service for Leveraged Bond
Total Bond Oustanding
Risk

The literature defines risk as the volatility
(standard deviation) of the volatility of percentage
change in operating income (Titman and Wessels,
1988). In this study, the risk is measured as a fiveyear standard deviation of changes in net
operating income (Operating Net).

The pecking order theory
predicts a negative
relationship between
business risk and leverage
(Sonola, 2018).
Negative (-)
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Data
This study relies on secondary data from the CWSRF National Information Management
System (NIMS) database, which contains the detailed fund information and fund analysis
(CWSRF financial indicators) of the 50 states, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the
U.S. territories from 1988 to 2019. This essay only focuses on the panel data of 50 states over 30
years from 1990 to 2019. The first two years (1988 and 1989) were eliminated, since the
program was not yet fully implemented. There are outliers identified among several variables –
for instance, the total assets of New York, and some of the largest profitability ratios belong to
South Carolina. The essay then winsorizes all of the variables at the first and ninety-ninth
percentiles to reduce any bias of extreme values.
Research Method
Unit root tests in Table A.2 in Appendix A suggest that the total debt variable is
stationary at first. At the same time, the debt service reserve ratio (DSRR) is nonstationary, and
other predictors are stationary at the level term. Due to the nature of dynamic panel data, the
application of standard regression estimators such as OLS, random effects, or the fixed-effects
model may be biased. Instead, this essay describes the use of the two-step system Generalized
Method of Moment (GMM-Sys) model to estimate the dynamic panel data for this essay. GMMSys is designed for a dynamic panel model with specific conditions for application, such as the
panel data with the number of cross-sections (N) larger than the time span (T). It requires the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the equation, using instrumental variables; the
number of instrumental variables should be smaller than the number of groups (N). According to
Roodman (2009), System GMM is widely recommended because it allows for more instruments
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that dramatically improve efficiency. This two-step system GMM model also does not require
distributional assumptions like normality, it helps control the endogeneity of lagged dependent
variables and control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Roodman, 2009).
GMM-Sys is also popular in the capital structure literature due to its ability to cure the
problem of endogeneity. Following Roodman (2009) and references in previous research, this
essay builds the GMM-Sys model for total debt and annual/new debt. GMM-Sys allows the
explanatory variables to be treated as potentially endogenous, predetermined, or strictly
exogenous. The actual choice made is based on theoretical considerations (from the literature)
and on the diagnostic test outcomes (which are available and built-in with the xtabond2
command and its results). Diagnostic test results indicate the validity of instruments collectively;
it is the same for the subsets of instruments (regressors being treated as endogenous or
exogenous and those generated by the lagged dependent variable). A high number of regressors
treated as being endogenous means that more instruments are employed (Piper, 2014). As
suggested by previous studies, determinants such as profitability, organizational size, the growth
rate of total assets, and so on could also be influenced by the capital structure, or there may be a
possible inverse causality between them (Forte, Barros, & Nakamura, 2013). Thus, these
predictors can be considered potentially endogenous variables. There are also options and suboptions available so that researchers can employ them to adjust the fit of the GMM-Sys model.
Results and Discussions
Descriptive and Trend Analysis
This section concentrates on states that leveraged and their average debt ratios to answer
the first question of state leverage profiles and how they change over time. Fourteen states
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reported no leveraging at all; the leveraged state group is divided into three subgroups: statematch leveraging only (7), additional (excluding state-match) leveraging only (12), and
leveraging for both state-match and additional purposes (17), as presented in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1
Overview of Leveraging

Within the leveraging group, there was significant variation in leveraging. Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, New York, and Connecticut appear to leverage
more aggressively than other states; their average total leverages ranged above 50 percent, as
shown in Figure 2.2. This is consistent with documented findings in the literature. Connecticut
and Massachusetts were identified as outliers among the New England states and had relatively
higher debt burdens than the national average (Weiner, 2013). Their high debt levels are
explained by two arguments: the greater state government responsibility and old infrastructures
(Weiner, 2013, p. 17). These states also reported a consistently high average new debt issued
(around 8 percent). At the other end, states that only leverage for match purposes showed
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minimal reliance on debt. Their total leverage ratios were lower than 10 percent. For instance,
Arkansas, New Hampshire, and Louisiana showed almost zero outstanding debt. This is
supported by the fact that some states only leverage for the state-match requirement (20 percent of
federal capitalization), which must be available so that states are eligible for federal appropriation.
The leveraging for state match is then repaid within the fiscal year; thus, there is zero outstanding
debt balance at the end of the reporting period.
Figure 2.2
Average State Leverage Ratios
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Both the mean annual total and the new leverage ratios were fairly stable and showed a
slightly declining trend over the years, as shown in Figure 2.3. For total leverage, the mean
annual maintained the peak period in the second decade at around 30 percent, and then it
gradually declined in recent years since 2013 and went down to 24 percent in 2019. New
leverage reached a peak of 12 percent in 1991, and then decreased to the lowest 1 percent in
2014 and increased to 2 percent in 2019. In short, there are many factors that could influence
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such a downtrend; CWSRF’s accumulation of contributed capital (which adds to the increase of
total assets over time) might be one reason associated with it.
Figure 2.3
Mean Annual Leverage Ratios (Leveraged States Only)
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Table 2.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the entire sample. Financial variables are
inflation-adjusted to 2016 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index. On average, for all states and
all years, CWSRF’s total leverage ratio showed a mean of 20 percent of total assets, and the new
leverage ratio was smaller at the mean of 3 percent. These two proxies for leverage appear to be
smaller than the average long-term debt ratio (39 percent) and the short-term debt (4 percent) of
quasi-public water enterprises, as reported by Sonola (2018). The overall standard deviation for
total debt was 24 percent, implying a scattered range of total leverage ratios.
The average profitability in the data was 1 percent, reflecting the not-for-profit nature of
CWSRF, where loans are offered under the market rate. However, CWSRFs are still profitable
and imply the possibility of supporting debt service and the continued operations of the funds.
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The mean annual profitability ratio remained at a higher rate during the second decade, reaching
the peak of 1.8 percent in 2001 and then descending significantly to 0.7 in 2010, the Recession
year, reaching the lowest of 0.4 - 0.5 percent in the following years (2013 to 2016); the annual
rate increased back to 0.8 percent in 2019. The unleveraged states, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Georgia reported the highest average profitability scores (2.2 to 2.6 percent), while Kansas,
Indiana, and Arizona showed negative profitability. The mean weighted loan interest (WAIRL)
was 2.3 percent for the whole sample, ranging from zero to 5 percent. The mean annual interest
reported was relatively high during the first decade, with a peak in 1992 (3.2 percent), and then it
gradually decreased over the last two decades, reaching 1.4 percent in 2019. Vermont offered a
zero-interest rate, Connecticut consistently maintained a 2 percent rate throughout the study
period, and Ohio, Texas, South Carolina, Arkansas, New Hampshire, Iowa, and Alabama
charged more than 3 percent, on average, during the 30 years.
Table 2.3
Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Total Leverage
New Leverage
Profitability
WAIRL (percent)
Size (billion)
Growth
FROI
DSRR
Risk

Mean
0.20
0.03
0.01
2.27
1.09
0.16
1.92
0.10
8.34

Std. Dev.
0.23
0.07
0.01
1.23
1.46
0.31
0.85
0.17
41.07

Min
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.02
-0.05
0.00
0.00
0.05

Max
0.68
0.39
0.04
5.00
9.21
2.15
4.33
0.66
320.72

Total assets or size factor showed more significant variability than other factors. The
mean inflated total assets was $1.09 billion and fluctuated from $0.02 million, probably in the
program’s early years, to the largest at $9.21 billion. On average, by state, New York ($7.5

35
billion), Massachusetts ($3.5 billion), Ohio ($3.2 billion), Texas ($3.3 billion), and California
($3.1 billion) were some of the largest CWSRFs, while Vermont, Delaware, Idaho, Montana, and
Nebraska were among the smallest sizes, with their average total assets ranging from $0.15$0.19 billion. The size of CWSRF keeps expanding over time. The mean annual total assets
sequentially rose from $0.12 billion at the starting year to $1.58 billion in 2019. The
accumulation of federal capitalization would significantly contribute to such expansion.
In considering the growth factor, the average change rate of the total asset (growth factor)
was 16 percent, widely ranged with a minimum of negative 5 percent and a maximum of 215
percent. Like the loan interest, the mean annual growth rate burst during the first decade, peaked
at 81 percent, but then steadily dropped to the lowest 2.2 percent in 2014. It increased modestly
back up to 3.4 percent in 2019. Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, Minnesota, Indiana, and Maryland
had the largest mean growth rates, at above 20 percent. Utah, New Mexico, and Georgia had the
lowest mean growth rates, at about 10 percent, and these states are non-leveraging. The CWSRF
internal growth rate FROI had a mean of 192 percent, which indicates that each $1.00 in federal
funds invested in the program resulted in $1.92 in (loans) projects in the CWSRF. This number
ranged from zero to 433 percent. During the three decades in the study, the average annual FROI
showed an uptrend, growing from 96 percent at the beginning to 271 percent in 2019. Minnesota,
New York, Rhode Island, Texas, Massachusetts, and Colorado represented the leading group,
with an average of 274 to 337 percent. Alaska, Delaware, Vermont, and West Virginia
maintained a mean FROI of around 100 percent at the other end.
The debt service reserve as a percentage of the outstanding debt ratio, DSRR, had a mean
of 10 percent, indicating very small collateral, resulting from the high cash flow character of
CWSRF and its creditability of bond repayment history (EPA, 2018). The mean reserve spread
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from zero to 66 percent during the three decades. Over the years, all states’ mean annual reserve
ratio reduced gradually, reaching 5.8 percent in 2019 from the highest of 13 percent in 1997.
Considering individual states, Missouri, Michigan, Colorado, New York, and Massachusetts
showed the highest average reserve: over 30 percent (32.8-49.2 percent). The risk factor (the
volatility of percentage change in operating income) indicated an extensive scattered distribution,
with a mean of 8.34 percent and ranging from 0.05 percent to 320 percent.
To further understand the CWSRF’s leveraging profile, the observations are divided into
four groups based on the outstanding debt ratio, as shown in Table 4.
Table 2.4
Degree of Leverage by Medians
Variable

No leveraging

Observation
New Lever.
Profitability
WAIRL
Size (billion)
Growth
FROI
DSRR
Risk

0%
619
0.00
0.014
2
0.31
0.08
1.3
0.00
0.3

Low
<=40%
490
0.00
0.009
2.3
0.60
0.05
1.98
0.02
0.5

Yes Leveraging
Medium
40%-60%
300
0.06
0.003
2.5
1.31
0.07
2.39
0.27
1.6

High
>60%
91
0.07
0.002
2.67
0.88
0.07
3.19
0.31
1.5

Table 2.4 illustrates further insight into the medians among leveraging groups. The
profitability of no leveraging observations indicates the highest rate (1.4 percent). It reduced to
0.9 percent when the level of leveraging gets to a low level and down to 0.3 percent at medium
and 0.2 percent at high leveraging levels. This suggests that CWSRFs with higher leveraging
have lower profitability. This is explained by the fact that costs associated with leveraging (bond
issuing and leveraged loans) may cause a reduction in the profitability of CWSRF. On the
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contrary, weighted loan interest kept rising, inconsistent with increasing leverage, starting with 2
percent at zero leveraging to 2.6 percent at a high leveraging level. Observations with leveraging
showed a larger size. However, this was not subsequently correlated within the leveraged group.
The medium leveraging group indicated the highest median size ($1.31 billion). The growth rate
remained relatively high, at 8 percent, but it declined to 5 percent when the leveraging increased
from 0 percent to low leveraging. Within the leveraged group, growth increased steadily from 5
percent to 7 percent as the degree of leverage increased, suggesting that higher leveraging
contributes to the increased growth of CWSRF. FROI and DSRR, similar to WAIRL, increased
according to the degrees of leverage; FROI started from 1.3 percent with zero leveraging and
reached 3.19 percent when leveraging is high. Lastly, the risk factor indicates a dichotomous
pattern with the debt ratio. At a low leveraging level (below 40 percent), the risk was low (0.5);
the risk was high (1.6) at a high leveraging level (above 40 percent).
Table 2.5
Correlation Matrix
TL
NL
Profit.
WAIRL Log size Growth
FROI DSRR VIF
TL
1.000
NL
0.52***
1.000
Profit.
-0.47*** -0.19***
1.000
1.51
WAIRL 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.16***
1.000
1.09
LogSize 0.45*** 0.08*** -0.09*** -0.07***
1.000
1.65
Growth
0.023 0.54*** -0.07*** 0.27*** -0.30***
1.000
1.18
1.000
FROI
0.62*** 0.15*** -0.36*** -0.05** 0.58*** -0.19***
1.94
DSRR
0.66*** 0.31*** -0.27***
0.03 0.40***
-0.027 0.29*** 1.000 1.3
-0.05* -0.039 1.01
Risk
-0.0398
-0.033
0.05**
0.0398 -0.0243 0.07***

Note. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Table 2.5 presents the correlation matrix of the whole sample. As shown in Table 2.5,
most cross-correlation for independent variables was relatively small. The highest correlation
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between independent variables was 0.58 between size (log) and FROI. The VIF score is also
included in Table 2.5, indicating a small scale, giving less cause for concern about the
multicollinearity problem. Later, the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests in the first difference
GMM-Sys model would also support this.
Regression Results
Table 2.6 shows the primary results from the GMM-Sys regressions. In both system
GMM models, in addition to the lagged and two-lagged dependent variables, the study used
suitable lagged values of the regressors as instruments; this allowed these instruments to be
correlated with past or possible current errors. In the total leverage model, the profitability
variable was treated as potentially endogenous (correlated with past or possible current errors),
and the lagged dependent variable and the other six regressors (WAIRL, Size(log), DSRR, Risk,
FROI, and Growth) were considered as predetermined (correlated with the past but not with the
current and future errors). Time dummy variables were assumed to be strictly exogenous (not
correlated with error terms in all temporal periods). A similar treatment was applied in the annual
leverage model, except for the size (log) variable, which was also classified as potentially
endogenous as same as the profitability variable, with an additional two-lagged dependent
variable as a predetermined instrument. Doing this was expected to address the potential
endogeneity issues discussed earlier. The diagnostic tests reported in Table 2.6 confirm that our
identifying assumptions are statistically acceptable. The AR2 test yielded a p-value of 0.092 and
0.123, respectively >0.05, which means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The essay
thus accepts the null that the error term of the orthogonal deviations equation is not serially
correlated at the second order. The Hansen test revealed a respective p-value of 0.112 and 0.186,
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suggesting that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, or the essay accepts that instruments are
valid.
Table 2.6
System GMM Regression Results
Variables

Total Leverage
0. 923351*** (20.28)

L.TL
L.NL
L2.NL
Profitability
-0.4458768 (-1.18)
WAIRL
0.0019314 (1.20)
Size (log)
0.0444047***(3.97)
Growth
0.1639305***(5.79)
FROI
-0.0211657*(-1.96)
DSRR
-0.0076475 (-0.17)
Risk
-0.0000481 (-0.96)
Year Dummies
Yes
F Statistic
324.74
Number of observations
1350
Groups/Instruments
50/44
AR(2)
0.092
Hansen statistic
0.112
Note.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
t statistic in parentheses
P-value reported for AR (2) and Hansen statistic.

New Leverage
0.1877993***(2.86)
0.1409211 ***(3.30)
0.4943621 (1.04)
0.0028565 (1.39)
0.0456444**(2.17)
0.2236471***(5.80)
-0.0057185 (-0.33)
0.0250869 (0.55)
-0.0000423 (-0.84)
Yes
14.45
1350
50/34
0.123
0.186

The first interpretation from Table 2.6 is that the total leverage variable was highly
persistent; in both models, lagged total leverage and two-lagged annual leverages were the most
relevant predictors. The growth of total assets stood out as a determinant of the leverage ratios. A
percent change in the growth of assets was associated with a 0.16 percent increase in outstanding
debt ratio and a 0.22 percent increase in new debt issued in the short run at a 1 percent
significance level. This result suggests that high growth CWSRFs tend to resort to debt to

40
finance their expansion (loan assistance expansion), at least after they have exhausted their
internally generated funds – federal capitalization and retained earnings. This prediction is
consistent with pecking order behavior. The growth coefficient estimates were larger for new
debt than for outstanding debt, inferring that CWSRFs may issue more new debt to invest for
their expansion but that they do not necessarily have equivalent high debt levels (debt
outstanding).
The other robust inference is the statistically significant positive influence of the size on
leverage. This finding is the opposite of the assumption of pecking order theory, but it sides with
that of trade-off theory and many empirical studies in the private and nonprofit literature (McCue
& Ozcan, 1992; Smith, 2012; Sonola, 2018). It implies that the larger CWSRFs have more
access to the credit markets, and they are likely to use their credit reputations and leveraging
experiences to attract more debt.
The revolving rate of federal capitalization FROI was shown to negatively influence the
total leverage ratio; a percent change in FROI was associated with a 0.021 percent decrease in
outstanding leverage. This may imply that CWSRFs that manage their federal seed money more
efficiently (high utilization of federal investment) thus have more available funding for loan
activities and tend to maintain a lower level of outstanding debt.
Both profitability and weighted loan interest demonstrated no association with any debt
ratio. The literature on capital structure for nonprofit documents shows previous studies that
found their profit regressor not to be a determinant of debt financing. Calabrese and Ely (2016)
found that multisectoral American nonprofit organizations' total margin (profitability) is
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unrelated to tax-exempt borrowing. Yan, Denison, and Butler (2009) found that percent surplus
is not supported in their leverage model of large nonprofit organizations.
The long-run GMM-Sys coefficient results, calculated by the short-run or
contemporaneous coefficient, divided by one, minus the coefficient of lagged dependent variable
(Piper, 2014), indicated that the effects of size on total leverage are much more significant
(0.5793256). However, the growth and FROI were no longer significant, likely due to the high
value of the lagged coefficient in the total leverage model. The long-run effects of size
(0.0561985) and growth (0.2753594) on new leverage were higher than in the short-run.
Contribution and Conclusion
This essay provides a descriptive analysis of the CWSRF leveraging profile and explores
the capital structure of CWSRF through the lens of a private sector capital structure theory:
pecking order theory.
Overall, pecking order theory is somewhat applicable to CWSRF, a public entity. The
empirical findings suggest a mixed result. On the one hand, consistent with the pecking order
theory, this study found a strong positive significant relationship between change in total assets
(growth variable) and total leverage/new leverage. On the other hand, size showed a statistically
significant positive relationship with the total leverage, which is opposite to the prediction of
pecking order theory (instead, consistent with the prediction of trade-off theory). This finding is
not surprising, but it is in line with general empirical results in the literature, which usually find
support for financing behavior from a combination of critical theories (pecking order theory and
trade-off theory). In addition, the growth of federal capitalization (FROI) was also identified as a
relevant determinant that influences the total leveraging of CWSRFs.
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Regarding policy implications: even though the EPA encourages states to leverage to
increase the pools of funds for loans, this study shows that, on average, only 20 percent of the
capital structure of CWSRFs is primarily sourced from leveraging. The average for leveraged
states is 27.1 percent, and this number has tended to decline in recent years (to 23.8 percent in
2019). Within this range, the leveraging is at a relatively low level, lower than general nonprofit
or water enterprises (40%). Therefore, there is still “safe” room for CWSRFs to get extra funding
from this source of bonds.
Associated factors that explain the capital structure choices of CWSRFs identified here
can be a good reference source for CWSRF managers at CWSRFs. In general, the growth rate,
the federal return on investment (FROI), and the size are among the most important financial
factors that consistently influence the decisions to use leveraging, as well as the level of
leveraging by states. The empirical evidence implies that CWSRFs that are larger, or that grow
faster, tend to issue more new debt and to maintain larger amounts of outstanding debts, or they
are more reliant on bonds. On the contrary, CWSRFs that are either smaller or less growing
choose to leverage less new debt and maintain lower outstanding debt levels. These empirical
findings add more evidence from the public sector to the raised concern in the literature on
nonprofit capital structure with regard to “how to make smaller capital-starved nonprofits better
able to take advantage of the tax-exempt bond markets in a responsible manner” (Calabrese &
Ely, 2016, p. 473). The EPA should direct more attention to enabling small states with capital
needs to access the bond market.
It is noted that, whereas profitability (or sustainability) is not a determinant of CWSRF
capital structure, the federal return on investment – the revolving rate of federal capitalization –
is. This makes more sense in the context of CWSRF. CWSRFs generally do not seek to
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maximize profits while subjected to specific mandates as state entities. However, they do need to
sustain and to target other purposes, such as expanding the use of capitalization grants to meet
the needs of wastewater loans. Therefore, they are likely to sacrifice profitability but to prioritize
other growth purposes in their financing decision-making. This also raises concerns about the
program’s sustainability when the profitability is not receiving due attention.
Leveraging plays a vital role in implementing CWSRF; its cumulative contribution is
about $50.6 billion, almost the same as the cumulative federal and state capitalization of $54.2
billion; this accounts for a significant portion of CWSRF funding available for projects which
help to finance water infrastructure needs. Debt enables the leveraging of fiscal resources
(federal capitalization grant) to expand the resources (FROI) for current operations. However,
debt issuance may also pose a threat to the sustainability of CWSRFs. This research is essential
in understanding the organizational causes that motivate preferences for leveraging. Additional
research is needed to further examine the other external perspectives (economic, federalist,
citizen preferences) that encourage CWSRFs to issue and hold debts.
Limitations
Despite the contribution and the implications noted above, a few limitations to this study
should be noted. First, the study only covers the CWSRF. Further application to its twin, the
Drinking Water State Revolving Funds (DWSRFs), would provide a base for an interesting
comparison. Second, this study did not use the data from audited financial statements that were
separately prepared or incorporated by various state agencies (environmental, health, economic,
and others). Still, NIMS data is officially consolidated and managed by the EPA. Financial
statements might provide more detailed information, such as short-term liabilities or grants,
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which would add more insight into leveraging CWSRF. Finally, a qualitative study to understand
the viewpoint of crucial finance decision-makers in the CWSRF administration would
supplement further findings regarding their leveraging decisions. Both of the dependent variables
showed a high percentage of observations equal to zero (41 percent), which is similar to a case
on the study of financing for highways performed by Wang et al. (2007), who used randomeffects TOBIT model to treat the zero entries as censored.
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CHAPTER 3
LEVERAGING IN CWSRF: EVIDENCE FROM EXTERNAL FACTORS
Introduction
Debt financing is the most significant financial source for public infrastructure; as
Marlowe (2015) noted, about 90% of state and local capital spending is financed by debt. The
literature has documented a tremendous diversity in debt practices among states (Bahl &
Duncombe, 1993). Previous studies explain state debt financing using a variety of factors,
including voters’ preferences, political and institutional factors, borrowing costs,
intergovernmental revenue, and many other factors (Shi, Hendrick, & Park, 2018). Wastewater
infrastructure is no exception. In most states, Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF)
represents the largest source of federal assistance to states and local communities for funding
wastewater infrastructure (Gómez, 2013); however, the initial seed funding from Congress
would not be sufficient to meet the current environmental needs (Travis, Morris, & Morris,
2004). States are thus encouraged to contribute more than the minimum required 20 percent state
match and leverage to increase available funding. “Leveraging is a process through which a state
places its annual federal appropriation (and perhaps its state match funds) in a reserve pool to
guarantee the sale of revenue or general obligation bonds” (Travis et al., 2004, p. 464). Bond
proceedings are then placed in the CWSRF fund pool and are available for loans. The leveraging
practice among states is varied; some states do not leverage at all. Some engage in aggressive
leveraging, generating upwards of five dollars for every initial investment dollar. On the other
hand, states may choose a safer level of leveraging, with a trade-off of fewer dollars (about twoto-one) available (Travis et al., 2004).
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Leveraging can help increase available funds; however, it can also create challenges and
implications for the CWSRF program. Previous studies have pointed out several issues
associated with leveraging, such as financial capacity issues, borrowing costs, and consequences
for the program's long-term sustainability (Holcombe, 1992). Since leveraging mechanisms often
involve incredibly complex financial transactions that require highly trained financial expertise
sourced from other agencies or from the private sector (Heilman & Johnson, 1991), states must
consider these factors before leveraging. In addition, Heilman and Johnson (1991) and Morris
(1994) also emphasize that the decision to leverage is often a complex process on the part of the
states; it may involve a calculation of risk, perceived long-term and short-term benefits, demand
from communities for loan assistance, the water quality needs in the state, and myriad other
factors.
The purpose of this article is to explore the potential determinants of CWSRF’s decision
to leverage or to use debt financing. Following the median voter theory’s assumptions and
borrowing from previous studies on state debt financing determinants, this essay builds a model
of leverage CWSRF that emphasizes the demographics, socioeconomics, demand for service,
political factors, institutional factors, and the state management capacities that influence the
financial decisions of elected officials. Are these determinants relevant to CWSRF, and, if so,
how do they associate? This study contributes to the literature on debt financing in some crucial
ways. Although there is extensive research on state debt financing in general, there is a lack of
scholarly research on a specific infrastructure sector: water infrastructure; and there is a further
lack of research on a particular state authority: the environmental/water authority. This study on
the determinants of the financing decisions of CWSRF also expands to a more extended period
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(1990-2019). It includes more variables, as well as new operationalization when compared to
previous studies.
The remaining essay provides a synthesis of the previous work on the determinants of
state debt financing and expands the application of state debt determinants to the CWSRFs. The
essay then presents a discussion of the data and the method used. Finally, the last section
includes findings, as well as a discussion of contributions and practical implications.
Literature Review
There is considerable literature examining the factors that determine state debt issuance
choice and the level of state debt. The most common method employed is the interest group
approach, which focuses on the behavior of politicians who weigh the electoral costs and
benefits of debt financing (Ellis & Schansberg, 1999). Thus, financing decisions may be
influenced by political factors and by the characteristics of their constituency and may be
constrained by relevant debt institutions.
In the early years, Bahl and Duncombe (1993), borrowing from the literature on the
demand for local public services, considered how demand for services, government spending, the
composition of debt, and historical debt influence the use of long-term debt by state and local
government during the 1980s. Ellis and Schansberg (1999) focused on the way in which the
demographic, political, and institutional factors, controlling for income and capital spending,
impact debt accumulation at the state level. Wang, Hou, and Duncome (2007) developed a model
with demographic, socioeconomic, political, and institutional variables to capture the behavioral
patterns of voters and politicians when making capital financing decisions (pay-as-you-go
financing). More recently, Kim and Lim (2018) employed a political market framework to
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explore the mediating role of political institutions in state financing decisions within different
institutional settings. Particularly, Schneider (2019) examined determinants of debt financing for
highway capital spending in the states by using a variety of socioeconomic measures
representing the median voter model, controlling for political and institutional factors, and
others. The following literature categorizes these dependent variables and determinants into
relevant groups and reviews the documented empirical evidence about each one.
Dependent Variables
The literature measures the debt burden in the flow of debt (the new debt issued) and the
stock of debt (outstanding balance). Debt burden can also be defined as the amount of debt or the
debt ratio. Scholars often consider total outstanding debt per capita (Liu, Moldogaziev, &
Mikesell, 2017), long-term debt per capita (Clingermayer & Wood, 1995; Kim & Lim, 2018),
outstanding debt as a percentage of per capita income (Bahl & Duncombe, 1993), total debt held
at the state level (Greer & Denison, 2016), and total annual issued debt to its
expenditure/government spending (Ellis & Schansberg, 1999; Schneider, 2019; Temple, 1994) as
dependent variables. More than one dependent variable is often used in a study. For instance,
Ellis and Schansberg (1999) operationalized debt financing decisions as to the use of debt
relative to another method of financing state budget, using the ratio of a state’s change in total
debt to its expenditures for a given year (Ellis & Schansberg, 1999, p.574). This measure
indicates the proportion of state government spending financed by issuing debt rather than taxes
or federal aid to states. Schneider (2019) also used the amount of new issue bond proceeds
divided by highway capital spending as the debt share dependent variable. Following the debt
share approach (Ellis & Schansberg, 1999; Schneider, 2019), this study looks into the debt flow
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in both aspects: new debt issue as the percentage of loan assistance (flow of debt-share) and the
annual debt issue per capita (flow of debt level).
Independent Variables
This section provides a review of debt financing determinants emphasizing three main
perspectives: (1) the voter factors, (2) the political factors, and (3) the institutional factors.
Voter Factors. Median voter theory proposes that government decisions are based on
the preferences of decisive voters under certain conditions. Following the modified median voter
model used by Wang et al. (2007), Schneider (2019), and other empirical studies, this section
reviews voter demand as well as socioeconomic and demographic factors related to preferences
of the median voter for debt financing. Thus, this factor category includes several subfactors
such as service demand, demographics, and economic factors (voter’s demand, age, and
income).
Population Density. Bahl and Duncombe (1993) argued that demand for services is
affected by several factors, including debts. A higher debt burden is expected to be positively
associated with a growth in demand for government services that require massive capital
expenditures. Service demand is captured by three sets of indicators: by population size (in
millions), by population density (persons per square mile), and by the growth rate in the
population. Larger populations and greater urbanization rates reflect increased demand for
services, creating pressure to increase infrastructure spending. Similarly, the growth of
population and urbanization increase the rate of capital spending and, therefore, the debt burden.
A series of variables are used to proxy the demand for specific services such as public school and
college enrollments, per capita domestic water consumption (thousands of gallons per day per
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person), per capita energy consumption (billions of BTU per capita), state park acres per square
mile of state land (Bahl & Duncombe, 1993), and miles traveled vehicle per 1,000 residents
(Schneider, 2019). Each should be positively associated with the level of the debt burden. The
findings are mixed. Bahl and Duncombe (1993) concluded that population density tends to
increase debt burdens. A higher population growth rate is associated with a greater debt claim on
personal income; states with larger populations and higher per-capita personal incomes do not
incur more significant debt burdens. However, other authors found no evidence that population
density has impacted state long-term debt (Kim & Lim, 2018; Greer & Denison, 2016).
Needs. Particularly for CWSRF, Travis et al. (2004) used the environmental need data
collected from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Wastewater Management
and the demand for SRF loans as a proxy for service demand. They tested their relation,
respectively, with the number of funds leveraged by states. The higher the demand from
communities and the higher the need, the more pressure placed on leveraging to attract more
funds to meet that demand and requirement. This is also in line with the EPA's vision of the
CWSRF program. The findings indicated that environmental needs do not explain the decision to
leverage, but needs size is associated with leveraging scale (Travis et al., 2004). In addition, case
studies confirmed that some states with low demand for CWSRF loans have chosen not to
leverage their funds (Morris, 1994).
Age. Demographic differences across states may also affect voters’ preferences over debt
financing for infrastructure (Wang et al., 2007), and the median voter’s age also matters. To
capture differences in demand, scholars have studied the percentage of the population between
18 and 65 years of age and older than 65 (Ellis & Schansberg, 1999; Kim & Lim, 2018); the
percentage of the population under 18 and older than 65 (Greer & Denison, 2016); and the
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percentage of the people between 18 and 24 years and older than 65 (Wang et al., 2007;
Schneider, 2019). The use of these age groups helps distinguish between desires for government
spending that target both the elderly and the non-elderly populations. Based on the
intergenerational effects of public debt, it is hypothesized that older voters tend to prefer more
debt financing than younger voters (Brennan, 2012). The empirical results are also mixed. Kim
& Lim (2018) found a positive relationship between the population over 65 and the level of longterm debt. They contended that the older population expects more services from the government,
which can increase the level of state debt. Similarly, Wang et al. (2007) found that the share of
the population over 65 was negatively related to pay-as-you-go financing (equity financing),
suggesting that, as the population ages, they tend to prefer debt. To the contrary, other findings
showed a negative relationship between the older 65 age group and respective state debt
financing (Ellis & Schansberg, 1999) and the debt share of highway spending or new highway
bonding (Schneider, 2019). Greer & Denison (2016) found that a percentage of the population
under 18 was negatively associated with a lower rate of total debt outstanding at the state level.
Income. From an income perspective, there are different approaches to hypothesizing the
impact of income on debt choice; debt preference can be tied to income expectation (itemized
returns) or to debt affordability. For the former, lower-income individuals are assumed to be
constrained and are expected to prefer debt financing; states with relatively lower per capita
incomes will have a larger share of debt financing. The wealthier individuals who are bequest
maximizers (who itemize their tax returns) will favor tax financing because of taxes-paid
deductions (Wang et al., 2007). For the latter, the individual income per capita has frequently
been adopted as a proxy for state wealth (Bahl & Duncombe, 1993). Higher-income states are
more likely to generate debt because of their capacity to handle new debt (Ellis & Schansberg,
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1999; Fisher & Wassmer, 2014). Alternatively, state debt might decrease with an increased
ability to pay (Ellis & Schansberg, 1999). The findings are not conclusive. Greer and Denison
(2016), Liu, Moldogaziev, and Mikesell (2017), and Kim and Lim (2018) found a positive
relationship between income and debt, while Bahl and Duncombe (1993) and Ellis and
Schansberg (1999) found a negative relationship showing a decrease in debt when incomes are
increasing. Wang et al. (2007) found that the preference for financing from current taxation
(equity financing) increases as income increases (negative relationship). Notably, income is
found to be negatively related to new debt issued and positively related to debt level (debt per
capita) (Ellis & Schansberg, 1999).
Political Factors. It is said that debt issues are inherently political, as seen in political
debates by federal, state, and local governments over the issuance of new debt and debt levels
(Greer & Denison, 2016). Given that politicians have their self-interests and their own
opportunistic and ideological motives in their decisions to use financing mechanisms in addition
to weighing their constituencies' perceived interests, they will also consider maximizing their
electoral votes. Based on the assumptions of the political business cycle theory and the partisan
cycle theory, Wang et al. (2007) used the gubernatorial election year and party majority in the
Senate and House as determinants of a state’s use of pay-as-you-go financing (equity financing).
Notably, Kim and Lim (2018) applied the political market framework. They used three main
political variables for the state level, including political competition (consisting of an election
year and interparty competition), divided government, split legislature, and political turnover,
with the political institution as a mediating variable. Many other political factors, such as
political ideology (Greer & Denison, 2016), have been hypothesized and tested in the literature.
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Election Year. According to Nordhaus (1975), policymakers will make decisions
favoring the current generation over future generations. This is extended to debt-financed state
spending literature; Baber and Sen (1986) found empirical evidence to support the hypothesis
that state debt increases in anticipation of a gubernatorial election. Similarly, the debt illusion
hypothesis implies that the costs of public programs that are financed through current taxes are
more visible to voters, as compared to those financed through borrowing debt; thus, close to an
election year, state debt financing is likely to increase (Greer & Denison, 2016; Kim & Lim,
2018). However, Liu et al. (2017) asserted that “the election effect on debt issuance may be
contradictory. When facing elections, politicians may be less likely to issue debt to avoid being
blamed for too much debt accumulation; on the contrary, they may be more likely to issue debt
and invest in infrastructure to garner more votes” (Liu et al., 2017, p. 685). Some scholars tested
the relation between leveraging and the year before a gubernatorial election year (Clingermayer
& Wood, 1995; Kim & Lim, 2018). Others considered the gubernatorial election year.
Nevertheless, scholars found no evidence supporting the hypothesis that debt financing is likely
to increase closer to the election year (Wang et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2017; Kim & Lim, 2018;
Schneider, 2019).
Ideology. Political ideology is also considered a factor in the median voter’s preference
for using debt (Schneider, 2019). Researchers often use the political ideology index (which is
structured such that more liberal states have higher scores) and they find that states leaning more
liberal are more likely to issue debt at the state level. For instance, when liberalism increased
from the neutral to the most liberal position, the state debt per capita rose $50 (Clingermayer &
Wood, 1995). From the median voter’s approach, Wang et al. (2007) and Schneider (2019)
argued that majority parties in the legislature should represent the ideology of the median voter
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and thus tested two variables: (1) the Democratic majority in the state Senate and (2) the
Democratic majority in the state House of representatives to see whether Democratic control of
either or both chambers positively affects debt issuance for the highway. While Wang et al.
(2007) found no support for the assumptions, Schneider (2019) suggested that a Democratic
majority in the upper chamber is statistically and negatively related to the debt share of state
highway capital. This essay proposes that Democratic control of either or both chambers will
positively impact the decision to issue debt for CWSRF loan assistance.
Divided Government. It is assumed that there is less cooperation between parties in a
divided government, one in which no single party controls both legislative chambers and the
governorship. As a result, the parties tend to reach compromises in the budgeting process by
increasing spending without increasing taxation (Alt & Lowry, 1994). Thus, a divided
government is expected to lead to more reliance on debt financing. While some authors found
empirical evidence to support the assumption, others found the opposite result. Ellis and
Schansberg (1999) indicated that Democrats usually favor spending programs that require more
revenues or that imply a positive correlation with higher debt. Wang et al. (2007) found a
statistically significant negative relationship between divided government and the share of payas-you-go financing for capital projects. This suggests that the debt share of capital financing is
greater in a divided state government. Conversely, Clingermayer and Wood (1995) found
evidence suggesting that states with Democratic governors and Republican legislatures have
relatively less debt; this is the opposite of the divided government hypothesis. Schneider (2019)
suggested that a divided government is negatively related to bond financing. Similar to divided
governments, split legislature governments can affect the degree of long-term state indebtedness.
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Recently, Kim and Lim (2018) also found the positive effects of a split legislature on state longterm debt (p. 7).
Institutional Factors. The purpose of these legal institutional factors is to constrain
government officials’ behavior. That is, limits and rules are explicitly designed to support the
fiscal decision-making of government officials in favor of limits or rules, as embodied in state
statutes and constitutions (Johnson & Kriz, 2005). The state debt limit and Tax and Expenditure
Limits (TELs) variables are among the primary factors that influence state indebtedness, and
they are directly related to the debt financing decisions addressed in this study.
Debt Limits. Debt institutions can be captured by different limits, general obligation debt
limits, debt limits to a share of a defined revenue base, debt referendum, debt supermajority, or
debt prohibition (Ellis & Schansberg, 1999). Some states have more than one debt limit. These
limits are expected to restrict the growth of state debts, or these limits will be negatively
correlated with the state debt issuance and state debt outstanding. The literature documents
different ways of specifying this debt limit variable. Some studies define the variable as a single
dichotomous dummy with the presence of the limit equal to one and the absence equal to zero,
and others use each type of debt limit separately. As the earlier defined variable, debt limits
showed little to no impact on total long-term debt (Clingermayer, 1991). Individually, debt
prohibition, limited debt to a share of the revenue base, or debt referenda were shown to reduce
state debt (Ellis & Schansberg, 1999; Kiewiet & Szakaly, 1996). Bahl and Duncombe (1993)
constructed their own debt index and concluded that the stringency of the debt limits negatively
affects the level of debt.

56
In addition, there is a federal-level restriction on the use of public debt known as the
private activity bond (PAB) volume cap (Hildreth & Zorn 2005; Greer & Denison, 2016). State
and local governments can issue tax-exempt bonds to finance specific projects considered private
activities as defined in the tax code. For instance, sewage facilities are qualified private activities
and are subjected to an annual state volume cap (Tax Reform Act, 1986). While the general debt
limitation is more relevant to general state debt financing, this PAB volume cap is more specific
to the CWSRF’s leveraging. Thus, it will be used as a debt limitation for this essay. A new cap is
allocated to each state based on a formula: a state per capita debt issuance allocation (Tax
Reform Act, 1986). The annual cap was increased from the greater of $50 per capita or $150
million in 2000 to the greater of $105 per capita or $321.77 million in 2020 (and it is adjusted
annually for inflation). The $321.77 million minimum for small states offers a more generous
volume cap than the per capita allocation. The unused caps can be carried forward or converted
into Mortgage Credit Certificates. Thus, a state’s current volume cap or total cap can be defined
as its new allocation plus what is carried forward from its last three years, minus any allocation
converted into Mortgage Credit Certificates (Center of Finance Development Agency, 2021).
Tax and Expenditure Limits. TELs are intended to limit the amount of state revenues or
expenditure and thus to potentially motivate the issue of debt at the same level as TELs (Greer &
Denison, 2016), or they are assumed to have a positive association with state debt level (Bahl &
Duncombe, 1993; Kim & Lim, 2018). TELs can be measured as the stringency index and as a
dummy variable like the debt limit. The TELs index constructed by Amiel, Deller, and Stallmann
(2009) is the most popular. The index ranges from 0 for states with no TELs to 30 for states with
the most limiting TELs. Scores are based on following factors: the type of the TEL (revenue or
expenditure, constitutional or statutory), how the TEL was adopted, the level of restriction
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imposed, and the override and exemptions. Bahl and Duncombe (1993), Clingermayer and Wood
(1995), and Kim and Lim (2018) reported evidence that TELs are positively associated with state
debt, suggesting that debt can be a tool used for circumventing the intent of the TEL (Schneider,
2019). Since the Amiel et al. (2009) index is available from 1969 through 2005 only, Greer and
Denison (2016) assumed that TELs are relatively constant and extended the index through 2011,
based on the 2005 TELs. Similarly, this essay also uses the Amiel et al. (2009) index and spreads
it through 2019, based on the 2005 TELs.
State Capacity to Issue Debt/Debt Capacity. Historic debt is defined as debt capacity,
which is expected to be an essential factor influencing the decision to issue debt. Bahl and
Duncombe (1993) argued that once the state has reached a high level of debt, it takes a long time
for the debt to retire. Also, once the state often carries a high debt burden, there will be less
pressure from the voters to lower it. When the state debt is defined as outstanding debt (debt
stock), Bahl and Duncombe (1993) used historic debt as a control variable and found support for
their arguments that states with high debt levels would be more likely to rely on debt relative to
other states. Kim and Lim (2018) also found that lagged debt per capita positively correlated
with current long-term debt per capita. When the debt variable is proxied as debt share of
spending, the prior debt level is assumed to be negatively related to debt issuance. Temple
(1994) suggested that a state with lower debt outstanding would incur lower interest expenses;
thus, the debt share of expenditures would be higher. However, the empirical evidence did not
show the outstanding debt as significantly related to the debt share. Recently, for highway
infrastructure, debt outstanding was found to be negatively correlated with the debt share of
capital outlay (Schneider, 2019). Since this essay uses the debt share of loan assistance, not the
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share of spending as Temple's (1994) assumption, this study uses historic debt and hypothesizes
that it positively affects CWSRF financing decisions.
In addition, federal funding would also affect state debt capacity. Prior studies reported
that federal grants were negatively related to debt financing (Kim & Lim, 2018; Temple, 1994),
suggesting that states with higher federal contributions would borrow less for capital funding.
Schneider (2019) found that the federal share of highway capital outlay was negatively
associated with debt share and new bond issue financing. This essay also uses federal share as a
percentage of loan assistance as a proxy for federal contribution and attempts to test whether it
will influence the state's debt share and debt per capita.
For CWSRF, Travis et al. (2004) also measured state commitment and state capacity and
their impacts on leveraging, as suggested by Lester's model (Lester, 1994). Because leveraging
requires a significantly higher institutional capacity to implement (Heilman & Johnson, 1991), it
is expected that states with stronger institutional capacity will be more likely to leverage. The
findings showed mixed support for Lester's commitment/capacity model. The institutional
capacity was significant at both stages of the decision process: the decision to leverage and the
level of leveraging.
Model Specification, Hypothesis, and Data
CWSRF Leverage Model
The model is built on the assumption of median voter theory, which hypothesizes that
voters' preferences will influence government decisions under certain political and institutional
conditions. The median voter preferences are determined by income, age, and specific demand
factors. The electoral cycle and government composition variables capture voter ideology and
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the politics that influence voters’ preferences. At the same time, the choices of median voters are
constrained by institutional limits via state debt limits, tax and expenditure limits, and state
capacity to issue debt. This essay will examine all the factors described to explore their
association with the leveraging state decision.
The exploratory model to explain the CWSRF’s leveraging is presented below:
Leverage = ϕLeverageit-1 + β1 Sit + β2 Pit + β3 Iit + μi +dt + εit
Where leverage of state i at time t is the annual new debt issued for addressing loan
assistance needs. The dependent variable will be measured in two ways: the choice of debt
financing relative to other methods and debt scale. The first is to measure the annual new bond
issued as the share of total annual loan assistance in CWSRF. This measure indicates the
proportion of CWSRF’s loan assistance financed by issued debt rather than by federal
appropriation to states. As noted in the literature, a ratio approach makes it difficult to isolate the
effects of the independent variables on debt, which may lead to problems in statical inference
(Kronmal, 1993). Another dependent variable, the new bond issued per capita, will be included to
address this potential issue. Clingermayer and Wood (1995) also measured debt per capita (debt
level/stock of debt per person) as they argued that it controlled for differences between states due
solely to disparate state population size (Clingermayer & Wood, 1995, p.110). Leverage

is a

lagged dependent variable, ε is the error term, μ represents unobserved state-specific effects,
and d stands for time fixed effects. S is the vector of social-economic variables, P is the vector of
state politics variables, and I is the vector of institutional variables. In short, this essay will
analyze the preferences of voters in making the determination, the state political environment,
budgetary institutions in the state, and state capacity to issue debt. Table 3.1 provides the
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description and measurement of the two dependent variables. Detailed data codes for each NIMS
item can be found in Table A.1 of Appendix A.
Tables 3.1
Dependent Variables
Dependent
variables

Definition/measurement and Data

Debt share (Debt
Debt per dollar of loan assistance: a ratio of annual bond issued to its
financing relative to dollar of loan assistance for a given year
other methods)
Annual Gross Leveraged Bonds Issued+Annual Match Bond Issued
Annual Loan Assistance
Level of leveraging
(Debt per capita)

The ratio of annual bonds issued to its population in a given year
Annual Gross Leveraged Bonds Issued+Annual Match Bond Issued
State Population

Table 3.2 below describes all independent variables used in the study, along with the
expected direction of the variable’s relationship with leverage. A detailed description of the
formula for each independent variable follows.
Table 3.2
Independent Variable Specification, Data Sources and Hypothesized Sign
Variable
Name

Definition/measurement

Socioeconomic factors/Voter’s preference
Population
Persons per square mile
density
(POPDEN)

Data Source

Census
Bureau

Expected
Sign
Positive (+)
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Table 3.2 Continued
Variable
Name
Old
population
(OLD)
Young
population
(YOUNG)
Income per
capita
(INCOME)
Environmental
needs
(NEEDS)

Definition/measurement

Data Source

Percent of the population 65 and over

Census
Bureau

Percent of the population under 18

Census
Bureau

Real per capita personal income

Bureau of
Economic
Analysis
The total environmental needs consist of seven EPA
categories. States report this list of needs
every four years, beginning in 1988. Although
the actual needs may change, the estimates of
years between reports (every four years) are
considered as the same amount reported. The
most current needs reported in 2012 are also
extended to 2016-2019.
Political Variables
Gubernatorial Dummy variable, if it is gubernatorial
election year
election year = 1, otherwise = 0
(ELECT)
Divided
Dummy variable, if governor and majority of
Government
both chambers are of different parties = 1,
(DIVIDED)
unified party control = 0
Senate
Dummy variable, if Senate majority party is
Democratic
Democratic = 1, otherwise = 0
Majority
(SDEM)
House
Dummy variable, if House majority party is
Democratic
Democratic = 1, otherwise = 0
Majority
(HDEM)
Institutional factors
Tax and
TEL state index
expenditure
limit (TEL)

Expected
Sign
Positive (+)

Negative (-)

Negative (+)

Positive (+)

Book of the
States

Positive (+)

Book of the
States

Positive (+)

Book of the
States

Positive (+)

Book of the
States

Positive (+)

(Amiel et al.,
2009)

Positive (+)
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Table 3.2 Continued
Variable
Name

Definition/measurement

Private
activity bond
(PAB) volume
cap

The annual total amount of cap (new cap plus
any carried over amount)

Debt capacity
(HODEBT)

Outstanding debt at the beginning of the year lagged (Total Outstanding Debt)

Federal share
(FEDSHARE)

Federal appropriation per dollar of loan
assistances

Data Source

Expected
Sign
Negative (-)

Council of
Development
Finance
Agency
(CDFA,
2021)
NIMS
Negative (+)
NIMS

Negative (-)

Annual Federal Contribution
Annual Loan Assistance

Data
The EPA has collected the NIMS database annually since 1988 from the 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and the five U.S. territories. This study focuses on 50 states and does not
include the District of Columbia or the five territories. The program’s first two years, 1988 and
1989, are eliminated since the program was not yet fully implemented. Nebraska is dropped
because of its unique unicameral legislature (Chen, 2017). As a result, the essay has balanced
panel data, including 49 states observed over 30 years. The two dependent variables are the debt
ratios calculated using the NIMS data and the population of 49 states. Other data of independent
variables are collected from different external sources, as noted in Table 3.2. As noted, the
Private Activity Bond (PAB) data only cover from 2005 to 2019; thus, this variable is excluded
in the GMM-Sys analysis of both models. Instead, a separate regression will be conducted for 15
years where PAB (Private Activity Bond) information is available. Another issue noted is that
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there is extreme value detected in the sample, such as the negative value of new debt issues (five
observations), negative loan assistance (one observation), and debt share of loan assistance
(11255%). To reduce the potential bias of outliers, this essay winsorizes all variables except for
the dummy variables and the TEL index at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Four variables
with absolute amounts, including income, needs, PAB, and outstanding debt, are transformed
using the log. Financial variables are inflation-adjusted to 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index.
Research Method
The previous literature on state debt choice indicates that the two-way fixed-effects
model for panel data is the predominantly used approach to estimating the results. Driscoll-Kraay
(DK) standard errors are also recommended, instead of White and Newey-West standard errors,
because they are more robust to general spatial and temporal dependence forms (Hoechle, 2007).
However, the two-step system Generalized Method of Moment (GMM-Sys) is considered more
advanced to random-effect and fixed-effect models. GMM-Sys allows us to model for any
unobserved fixed effects represented by 𝜇 explicitly and includes lagged dependent variables
among regressors to address potentially omitted variables (Forte et al., 2013, p.361). It also
enables us to use lagged values of the regressors as instrumental variables to address the likely
endogenous relationship between the regressors and dependent variables. GMM-Sys also has its
limitation because it is complex and does not address cross-sectional dependence. This essay
thus estimates debt share and debt per capita models using the GMM-Sys estimator and reports
the two-way fixed effect estimation results for reference.
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The system GMM-Sys– xtbond2 enables researchers to treat explanatory variables as
potentially endogenous (correlated with past or possible current errors); predetermined
(correlated with past but not current and future errors); or strictly exogenous (not correlated with
error terms in all temporal periods). It also allows us to include options such as the lags option,
the collapse option, and more, to facilitate the use of instruments. The diagnostic tests are
embedded in the system and are subjected to certain conditions for accepting the result of GMMSys regression (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Forte et al., 2013; Piper, 2014). However, Roodman
(2009) also offers what he calls a ‘common sense’ value for judging the outcome of diagnostic
tests (Piper, 2014).
Finally, because many states do not issue debt for loan assistance or do not use it each
year, over 60 percent of the observations for the dependent variables are zero. Wang et al. (2007)
use the random effects Tobit model to treat zero entries as lower limit censored to estimate the
impact on the debt ratio. This essay also runs the random effects Tobit model for references.
Results and Discussions
Descriptive Analysis
Among 50 states, 14 states report no leveraging throughout the 30 years; the remaining
36 states decide to issue bonds to fund their loan assistance to the communities. Total loan
assistance in the states over the 1990 to 2019 period was more than $137 billion (excluding
Puerto Rico). On average, for all states, bond issued accumulation (over $50 billion) accounted
for 36.7 percent of total loan assistance over the same period, which indicates a significant role
of bond financing in CWSRF loan assistance. In terms of individual states, Figure 3.1 below
illustrates the average debt share and the average bond proceed per capita of 35 leveraged states
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(excluding Nebraska) and their diverse variation. On the one side, states depend significantly on
bond proceedings to finance their loan activities (50 percent to 114 percent); on average, more
than 80 percent of loan assistance from Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Indiana
were sourced from debts. The debt per capita of these states also indicated a relatively high
corresponding rate with their debt share ratio; Rhode Island was peak among these ($28).
Incidentally, Massachusetts ($11,059), Connecticut ($9,837), Rhode Island ($8,472), and NY
($6,893) also reported the top median general state debt per capita (Murphy, 2019). On the other
side, some states showed a minimum reliance on debts to finance loan assistance. New
Hampshire, Mississippi, Oregon, Louisiana, and California each had a minor average debt share
ratio.
Figure 3.1
Mean Debt Ratios by Leveraged State
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In terms of the period, Figure 3.2 shows the mean annual debt share, and Figure 3.3
presents the mean annual debt per capita for only those states that issued debt, as well as the
number of issuing states.
Figure 3.2
Mean Annual Debt Share (DEBTSHARE) for the Issuing States
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Both figures reflect a similar unstable debt trend that peaked in 2004 and bottomed in
2014. The mean annual debt share in Figure 3.2 varied between 15 percent and 72 percent of loan
assistance during the study period. During the recession years, CWSRF received the largest
nominal amounts of federal appropriation ($2.7 billion in 2009). In addition to that, CWSRFs also
received $2 billion in supplemental funds under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(Copeland, 2015). This may suggest that CWSRF did not suffer insufficient revenue to support
loan assistance during the Recession. However, right after the Recession, more states were issuing
debt, and the level of debt increased. The average amount of debt issued by the states reached the
second-highest level in 2011: 53 percent. In the same year, 2011, the number of issuing states was
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20, the highest during the study period. In recent years, the mean annual debt share has decreased
considerably (38 percent to 25 percent) in Figure 3.2. In contrast, the mean annual debt per capita
has increased slightly ($8.3 to $8.9) in Figure 3.3. This opposite direction trend may suggest that
the loan assistance grows faster than that of the population since both ratios have the same
numerator (the annual debt issued).
Figure 3.3
Mean Annual Bond Proceeds Per Capita for Issuing States
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Table 3.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the entire sample for the state panel data
between 1990 and 2019, including the mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum value, and
maximum value for each variable. For the dummy variables, the mean reports the occurrence
percentage of observation with a value of 1, whereas the standard deviation is not applicable.
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Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistic
Variable
DEBTSHARE
DEBTPC
POPDEN
YOUNG
OLD
NEEDS (billion)
INCOME
ELECT
SDEM
HDEM
DIVIDED
TEL
PAB (billion)
HODEBT (billion)
FEDSHARE

Mean
0.28
5
191
0.25
0.13
4.77
41822
0.27
0.47
0.52
0.49
9
1.56
0.34
0.65

Sta. Dev.
0.57
12
254
0.02
0.02
6.34
8152
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
8
1.54
0.78
1.03

Min
0.00
0
1
0.19
0.06
0
24575
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.00

Max
3.33
59
1176
0.32
0.19
39.56
74342
1
1
1
1
30
12.05
6.44
7.02

For the entire sample, the average debt as a percentage of loan assistance was 28 percent,
which is noticeably smaller than 39 percent of leveraged states. Its significant standard deviation
(57 percent) indicated a considerable scattered range of the ratio. Similarly, the debt per capita
was also dispersed, with a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 12 dollars per capita. In looking
at the citizen preference independent variables group, the average population density was 191
persons per square mile, fluctuating from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 1,176. The average
real per capita personal income over the study period was $41,822, ranging from a low of $24,575
to a high of $74,342. About the population's age distribution, the average share of under 18-yearolds in the population was one-fourth, and the number ranged between 19 to 32 percent. The
older population represented a smaller share, averaging 13 percent and ranging from 6 percent to
19 percent. The average need for wastewater treatment was $4.77 billion per state year, and this
number varied between zero to $39.56 billion.
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Four political variables were all dummy variables, with 1 representing the presence of
establishment and 0 indicating the absence. Gubernatorial elections take place every four years,
except in Vermont and New Hampshire, where the governor is elected every two years. About
27 percent of the observations indicated (1) an election year. On average, 13.3 states per year had
an election year, with a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 36 states. Democratic Party control of
the Senate (SDEM) and House (HDEM) chambers was at 52 percent and 47 percent, across the
sample. The mean number of states having the HDEM by year was 25.3, with a minimum of 16
and a maximum of 37 states each year. The mean number of states by year having SDEM was
23.1, with a minimum of 13 and a maximum of 32 states each year. The percentage of the
divided government observation was 49 percent. There was an average of 24.2 states with
divided government; the number of states ranged from 11 to 32 per year.
In considering institutional variables, the state TEL index ranged from 0 (for no limits) to
30 (for most stringent limits). The mean TEL index was 9, suggesting that states still have room
for making their TEL more restrictive. The Private Activity Bond volume cap (PAB) had an
average of $1.56 billion per state year, ranging from zero to $12.05 billion. Historic debt levels
measure debt capacity. The average debt outstanding at the beginning of each year was $0.34
billion, far smaller than the average PAB limit. Similar to debt share and debt per capita ratios,
outstanding debt observations had a broad range in which 43.2 percent of observations were
zero, as the results of 14 states that did not issue debt during the study period. The maximum
outstanding debt was about $6.44 billion in New York. Debt capacity can also be influenced by
each state's federal share of loan assistance funding. The average federal share varied widely,
ranging from less than 30 percent in Massachusetts and Minnesota to over 95 percent among
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these unleveraged states such as Utah, Vermont, Delaware, and Alaska. The average federal
share across the states was 65 percent, ranging from zero percent to 698 percent.
Further looking into different debt issuing levels in Table 3.4, observations are
categorized into two groups: no leveraging and yes leveraging, which fell into four sublevels
zero, low, medium, and high leveraging, based on the value of the debt-share ratio.
Table 3.4
Medians by Leveraging Levels
Variables
No. of Obs.
DEBTPC
POPDEN
YOUNG
OLD
NEEDS (billion)
INCOME
ELECT
SDEM
HDEM
DIVIDED
TEL
PAB (billion)
HODEBT (billion)
FEDSHARE

No Leverage
0
890
0
101
0.24
0.13
2.03
39,686
0
1
1
0
7
1.10
0
0.38

Low (<0.5)
276
2
64
0.25
0.13
3.70
42,325
0
0
0
1
13
1.40
0.10
0.31

Yes Leverage
Medium (0.5-1)
170
15
140
0.25
0.13
4.18
42,399
0
0
1
1
10
1.15
0.52
0.25

High (>1)
134
23
88
0.25
0.13
2.74
41,227
0
1
1
1
10
1.02
0.37
0.32

Further looking into different debt issuing levels in Table 3.4, observations are categorized
into two groups: no leveraging and yes leveraging, which fall into four sublevels zero, low,
medium, and high leveraging, based on the value of the debt-share ratio. There are some
noticeable differences between the two groups. The no leveraging group had a lower median
percentage of young people, environmental needs, income per capita, TEL index, and outstanding
debts than the leveraged group. States issuing debt at all levels had a divided government; the
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opposite was true for the no leveraging states. Median population density, SDEM, and HDEM
showed no apparent pattern among the other variables. The median old population (13 percent)
and election (not an election year) remained the same across both leveraged and not leveraged
states. Income and PAB variables formed a similar pattern, reaching the highest median at the low
leveraging level and the lowest median at the high leveraging level. This suggests that the less
wealthy states either did not issue debt or issued debt the most while the wealthiest states issued
the least debt, and the medium income group coincidently incurred the medium level of debt.
Similarly, states with the lowest median PAB issued the most debt, and states with the highest
PAB issued the least debt. As expected, the highest median of federal share (38 percent) belonged
to the no leveraging group; the leveraged group had a lower rate, ranging from 25 percent to 32
percent. However, the states that received higher federal funding (32 percent) within the
leveraged group also issued high debt.
Empirical Analysis
Table 3.5 reports the regression results of DEBTSHARE and DEBTPC using the twostep system GMM estimator. This essay included lagged dependent variables and regressors with
suitable lagged values as instruments in the system GMM model. In the DEBTSHARE model,
the lagged dependent variable, real per capita income, environmental needs, population density,
and the young and old population rates were assumed to be predetermined; federal share and
historic debt variables were considered potentially endogenous. In contrast, other variables and
time dummies were treated as strictly exogenous. In the DEBTPC model, the lagged dependent
variable was treated as potentially endogenous; federal share, historic debt, and population
density were considered predetermined, and other variables and time dummies were assumed to
be strictly exogenous.
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Table 3.5
Regression Results
DEBTSHARE
Two-way FE
GMM-Sys
Leverage(t-1)
-0.169***
-0.182***
(-4.41)
(-3.44)
POPDEN
-0.0004
0.0004
(-0.91)
(1)
YOUNG
4.015
7.144
(1.35)
(1.08)
OLD
1.837
2.579
(1.49)
(0.7)
INCOME(log)
1.240***
-0.511
(3.3)
(-0.91)
NEEDS(log)
-0.033***
-0.074**
(-3.51)
(-2.08)
ELECT
0.044
0.075**
(1.39)
(2.03)
SDEM
-0.014
-0.050
(-0.71)
(0.75)
HDEM
0.001
0.081
(0.03)
(1.02)
DIVIDED
0.005
0.036
(0.24)
(0.75)
TEL
0.00006
-0.002
(0.01)
(-0.36)
HODEBT(log)
0.017***
0.046***
(5.57)
(4.39)
FEDSHARE
0.049**
0.057*
-(2.09)
(1.99)
Year dummies
Yes
R-squared
0.0841
F Statistic
183.5(<.001)
7.32(<.001)
No. of obs.
1421
1421
Groups/Instruments
49/45
AR(2)
0.443
Hansen statistic
0.196
Note. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Debt per Capita
Two-way FE
GMM-Sys
-0.017
-0.167**
(-0.25)
(-2.22)
-0.033
-0.002
(-1.32)
(-0.36)
171.3**
50.159
(2.22)
(1.22)
-49.1
17.919
(-0.95)
(0.39)
19.4***
8.867*
(3.04)
(2.01)
-0.572**
-0.284
(-2.35)
(-0.59)
0.378
-0.129
(1.1)
(-0.16)
0.352
-1.993
(0.79)
(-1.24)
1.276**
3.457**
(2.41)
-2.12
-0.085
1.039
(-0.22)
(1.39)
-0.005
-0.115
(-0.06)
(-1.39)
0.210***
0.496***
(3.77)
(2.68)
-0.46
-0.051
(-1.87)
(-0.3)
Yes
0.0547
106.31(<.001)
12.42 (<.001)
1421
1421
49/43
0.119
0.202
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Allowing these regressor instruments to be correlated with the error terms in the future
and/or contemporaneously was expected to address the potential endogeneity issues and to
reduce any concern related to potentially spurious inferences. The diagnostic tests results
reported in Table 3.5 confirm that our identifying assumptions were statistically acceptable. The
AR2 test yielded a p-value of 0.443 and 0.119, respectively (>0.05), which means the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. The essay thus accepts the null hypothesis that the error term of
the orthogonal deviations equation is not serially correlated at the second order. The Hansen test
revealed a respective p-value of 0.196 and 0.202, suggesting that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that our instruments are valid.
The first finding from Table 3.5 is that only a few variables indicate the association with
debt ratios. This finding can also be interpreted from the small value of R-squared, which is
0.084 for DEBTSHARE and 0.054 for DEBTPC. Regression results from two-way fixed effect
and two-step GMM-Sys estimators are relatively similar, with minor differences. Looking
further into the GMM-Sys estimation, the lagged DEBTSHARE and the lagged DEBTPT were
the relevant predictors of current debt ratios inferring that CWSRF debt ratios are persistent. The
proxy for debt capacity-outstanding debt, stood out as the consistently relevant predictor of the
debt ratios. As expected, the sign of the coefficient was positive, which is compatible with the
most prior empirical evidence in state debt financing, suggesting that when CWSRFs get used to
the higher level of debt, they may continue to maintain such a level, and it will take time to pay
back the debts. The historic outstanding debt effect was significantly larger for debt per capita
than for debt share.
In the DEBTSHARE model, NEEDS, ELECT, and FEDSHARE were also identified as
relevant determinants of debt share. The NEEDS was unexpectedly found to negatively correlate
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with debt share as a percentage of loan assistance. This suggests that a change in environmental
needs leads to a decrease in the share of debt supporting loan assistance per state year. As noted
earlier, as a ratio variable, it might be challenging to isolate the effects of environmental needs
regressor on the numerator (new debt issued) and denominator (loan assistance); further steps
should consider this. The coefficient estimates for our ELECT proxy had a positive sign, as
expected, suggesting that the CWSRFs tend to increase their debt issued for loan assistance
during an election year. While previous studies found no evidence of a relationship between
election and debt, this finding remarks an exciting point for future reference.
The other surprising inference is the positive influence of the federal share of loan
assistance on debt share. This result suggests that CWSRFs that receive a larger appropriation
from the federal government to finance their loan assistances tend to issue more bonds, which is
inconsistent with previous findings on debt financing. Such inconsistency may be due to the
unique characteristics of CWSRF’s leveraging regulations. States are motivated to issue bonds
for required matching (20 percent of federal appropriation), seven states issue bonds for the
matching purpose only, and 17 states issue for both matching and additional funding.
Accordingly, the increase in federal funding triggers an increase in bond issuance for matching.
This finding added a new perspective on the role of the federal grant on debt financing in the
SRF setting.
In the DEBTPC model, the findings also support the assumption that higher-income
CWSRFs are likely to have more debt per capita because they can afford to repay it. Although
the income variable is not significant with debt share, it indicates a negative direction. These
findings are relatively similar to those of Ellis & Schansberg (1999), who found income to be
negatively related to debt share but positively related to debt per capita. States with a Democrat
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majority in the lower chamber also tend to maintain more new debt per capita. In some two-way
fixed-effects regressions, we found a positive relationship between the younger population and
leverage. Still, this result is most likely spurious because it completely disappears in all models
estimated using system GMM.
Using two-way fixed effects adjusted with DK standard errors for 15 years of data from
2005 to 2019, this essay added the private activity bond cap back to the model and found that the
rate of young population became significantly positive, and the TEL index became negatively
significant with DEBTSHARE. The lagged DEBTSHARE remained negatively significant, other
variables were no longer significant. Similar estimated results were noted in the debt per capita
model for the young population rate and the TEL index. Additionally, population density became
negatively significant with debt per capita. These findings suggest that PAB is not a relevant
predictor of the CWSRF debt ratio.
Table 3.6 shows the results from the data random-effects Tobit model. The lagged
dependent variable was also included in the model. Table 3.6 also presents Tobit coefficients and
two marginal effects: (1) the probability of choosing whether or not to issue a bond; (2) the
change in the expected value of debt ratio conditional upon the use of debt (debt ratio >0). Like
two-way fixed effects, lagged debt per capita yielded an insignificant relationship with the
current DEBTPC. The results were relatively similar to the GMM model. Historical outstanding
debt and environmental needs remained the determinants of the debt ratio. Income was positively
significant with both debt share and debt per capita. However, political factors became no longer
significant with debt share and per capita. The federal share of loan assistance was no longer
significant with debt share, but it became significant with debt per capita. While the Tobit model

76
can address the issues of mass zero observations, it is a random effect regression, and it could not
accommodate the robust option to address other issues.
Table 3.6
Tobit Regression
DEBTSHARE
Random Effects
Marginal effects
Variables
xttobit
z-stat
Probability Conditional
Lagged DEBT
-0.28 -5.29***
-0.10
-0.07
POPDEN
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00
YOUNG
0.73
0.15
0.25
0.19
OLD
-0.76
-0.16
-0.26
-0.20
INCOME(log)
1.94 3.17***
0.66
0.50
NEEDS(log)
-0.05
-1.94*
-0.02
-0.01
ELECT
0.10
1.2
0.04
0.03
SDEM
0.02
0.17
0.01
0.00
HDEM
-0.02
-0.16
-0.01
0.00
DIVIDED
0.03
0.49
0.01
0.01
TEL
0.01
1.06
0.00
0.00
HODEBT(log)
0.07 9.37***
0.03
0.02
FEDSHARE
0.05
1.43
0.02
0.01
Wald chi2
155.82
Prob > chi2
0.000
Likelihood test of sigma_u=0
98.76
No. of Obs.
1421
Left-censored
851

DEBTPC
Random Effects
Marginal effects
xttobit
z-stat Probability Conditional
-0.06
-1.12
0.00
-0.02
0.01
1.21
0.00
0.00
111.19
1.15
1.93
29.06
-28.76
-0.31 -0.50
-7.52
30.52
2.55**
0.53
7.97
-1.13
-2.11** -0.02
-0.30
1.14
0.68
0.02
0.30
0.31
0.17
0.01
0.08
1.36
0.74
0.02
0.36
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.1
0.00
0.00
1.20
7.65***
0.02
0.31
-2.30 -3.19*** -0.04
-0.60
119.75
0.000
115.92
1421
849

Note. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Contribution and Conclusion
The purpose of this essay is to explore what factors are relevant for CWSRF’s decision to
issue debt to support loan assistance for wastewater infrastructure. Applying median voter model
assumptions and incorporating other variables suggested by empirical evidence from previous
research on government finance decisions, a model of external predictors of debt share and debt
per capita for CWSRF in the states was constructed that includes median voter preference
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variables, state political variables, and institutional limits/capacity variables. The results of the
GMM-Sys estimator indicate that a few relevant determinants can be identified. The previous
debt ratio was consistently negatively related to the current one, which supports the assumption
of the GMM-Sys model for the persistent dependent variable.
The results showed limited support for the assumption of median voter’s theory since
most preference factors did not show association with the CWSRF debt ratio. Only income and
environmental needs were significant with debt per capita and debt share, respectively. State
politics also indicated a limited association with leveraging; debt share tends to increase during
the election year, and debt per capita also tends to increase when the Democrat majority controls
the lower chamber. Other institutional factors, particularly debt capacity, appeared to be the most
relevant predictor of CWSRF’s leveraging. The more significant the historic debt level, the
higher the debt ratio, especially the debt per capita. The change in federal contribution may
trigger an increase in debt issuing for state matching purposes. Despite the limited association
identified, this study has established initial empirical evidence for leveraging this CWSRF –
innovative financing mechanism. In addition, the findings also draw attention to the distinctive
feature of CWSRF. A change in the federal contribution was found to be significant with an
increase in CWSRF’s debt issuance for state-match (a positive relationship), which is
inconsistent with previous studies (a negative relationship) of general state finance. More study
focusing on specific factors of CWSRF or further study on similar revolving fund settings like
Drinking Water or State Infrastructure Bank (SIB) would help build up this niche area.
Compared with highway infrastructure financing or with public state financing, CWSRFs
or wastewater infrastructure appear to receive less attention from state politics and are not as
much associated with other social-economic factors. Many reasons can explain such differences.
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Most of the bonds issued by CWSRF are revenue bonds backed by CWSRF's own resources and
not subjected to voter's approval and statutory debt limits as the general obligation (GO) bonds
issued by the state government, suggesting that state politics and legal constraints will have less
influence on CWSRF's leveraging. However, such underlying differences also raise another
concern about the limited state financial contribution toward CWSRF. Most of the states only
contribute 20 percent state match to the CWSRF program. About 70 percent of such amount is
cash appropriation and GO bonds secured by taxes and 30 is percent backed by the CWSRF's
revenue3. This means that the real contribution is only 70 percent of the 20 percent match. Such
smaller financial contributions certainly make CWSRF’s role in the state appropriating process
less influential than other programs. States are thus recommended to contribute to state-match
entirely using the state's own revenue resources, not CWSRF resources. Additional contributions
above the state match are also recommended. If that is the case, these further allocations will
surely help increase the CWSRF's program visibility and role in budgeting and financing
infrastructure processes.
In addition, the incoming cash flow from the recently passed infrastructure bill to
CWSRFs will likely increase the federal contribution and thus the 20 percent state match to a
more significant level. The bond issued for state match practice would lead to considerable loss
to the program when the debt is paid off. Finally, in terms of policy implication, CWSRF is the
effort of Congress to reduce the national government role and shift more control and discretion
to states in their water quality funding (Morris, 2022). The loose connection between the state
(state politics, state budgeting, and other factors) and CWSRF raises concern over how much the

3

Calculated from NIMS
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states have actively approached and taken over such "transfer" of power. Notably, states appear
to use other financial sources rather than their own revenue (cash or appropriation) as state match
or additional contribution to the CWSRF program casting doubt on the state's ownership and
stewardship of the CWSRF program.
Limitations
CWSRF has its unique characteristics: leveraging to offer loans to local governments and
participants of the program, not directly using their borrowing for infrastructure investment.
These differences somehow alter both their motivation for leveraging and the way in which they
manage leveraging, compared to the debt management of the other state agencies. New variables
that are more relevant to CWSRF should be tested. A future qualitative study that interviews
CWSRF administrators on their perceptions of leveraging would reveal more specific features
underlying CWSRF’s leveraging decisions.
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CHAPTER 4
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CWSRF’S DEBT AFFORDABILITY AND ITS
MEASUREMENT
Introduction
Debt financing for infrastructure investment is widely accepted, and it has become
popular among states; it expands the resources available to finance new infrastructure. However,
debt is not a source of revenue; instead, it is a financial obligation that commits future taxes in
order to secure financial resources in the present. The amount that a government can borrow is
restricted by its ability to repay. That, in turn, depends on the property and income wealth of the
citizens in that jurisdiction (Greer, 2013). States should consider their capital investment needs
versus their ability to meet debt service requirements, given other priorities and obligations
(Weiner, 2013). So how much debt can the state afford? What is an “acceptable and sustainable”
level of debt? What is the appropriate balance between pay-as-you-go financing and debt
financing? The answers to these questions remain in debate. In the literature, there is little
consensus on measuring affordability (Denison, Hackbart, & Moody, 2006). There is no clear
standard for making judgments about the specific amount of affordable debt for a jurisdiction
(Greer, 2013).
While the literature on state debt affordability mainly addresses tax-supported bonds,
there has been minimal research on non-tax-supported bonds as most Clean Water State
Revolving Fund (WSRF leveraged bonds. This essay fills that gap by scrutinizing the state
CWSRF’s debt repayment capacity or affordability. The paper will explore the following
questions: what is the current CWSRF debt affordability profile (debt service ratio); how is
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CWSRF’s debt service ratio, compared to general fund’s debt service ratio; which factors
influence CWSRF’s repayment capacity; and what is the predicted amount of debt affordability?
The essay includes a literature review on state debt affordability, a proposed model of
debt affordability prediction for CWSRF, expected results, and a conclusion. The essay first
analyzes debt affordability using the debt service ratio (annual debt service as a percentage of
total revenue) among leveraging states. The paper then examines the relationship between
revenue proxy factors (federal capitalization, match revenue, other state grants, operating
income) and other factors (per capita income and population) with annual debt service ratio,
respectively, and interprets them. After formulating the best-fitted regression model, the
predicted values of each independent variable are then used to forecast the future debt level, and
then affordability or capacity is assessed.
Literature Review
This section first provides a review of the classification of state debt and discusses how
debt affordability is defined. It continues with an introduction of the measurement of debt
affordability, including the different models and methodologies employed by states and
empirical evidence, with a focus on a regression model that is relevant for this essay. Following
that is a review of debt affordability metrics and the factors that potentially influence such
metrics. While the literature offers evidence on debt capacity measurement for the state level,
there has been minimal documentation, particularly for infrastructure funds and CWSRF, as
briefly discussed at the end of the review.
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Definition of State Debt Repayment Capacity or Affordability
Many different types of obligations may be described as state debt. In a broad approach,
state debt can be bonded debt, unfunded pension liabilities, unfunded other post-employment
benefits (OPEB) liabilities, budget deficits, or unemployment insurance loans. For this essay,
state obligation refers to bonded debt (GO bonds and revenue bonds). Government bonds can be
classified using different criteria – for instance, by revenues (general taxes, dedicated taxes, and
user fees), by purpose (public purpose, private purpose), by security (GO, revenue, and hybrid),
and by many other methods (Weiner, 2013). In a narrow sense, the definition of state debt
focuses on general obligation (GO) debt or tax-supported debt, which is typically backed by the
issuer’s full faith, credit, and taxing power. For measuring affordability, state policymakers and
rating agencies tend to focus on tax-supported debt, which can be sub-divided into the net or
gross tax-supported debt. In contrast, gross is broader in scope and includes certain types of selfsupporting debt (GO bonds with dedicated revenue and revenue bonds of state enterprises).
Denison et al. (2006) classified state debt using the source of funding for debt service,
which splits it into the general fund and the special revenue fund (an earmarked or dedicated
fund). Under the general fund sources, both traditional GO bonds and revenue bonds (referred to
as “lease-backed bonds”) are included. Under the special revenue fund, there are also both types
of bonds. GO bonds, or “double-barreled” bonds, are issued by a state agency with the sovereign
authority to tax and, therefore, can issue GO bonds independent of the state. Revenue bonds,
such as bonds issued for transportation projects, are backed by earmarked Road Fund revenue.
Most of CWSRF’s issued bonds are supported by its SRF (interest-earning, loan principal, and
others), while some of each state match bond is backed by the state general fund (EPA, 2018).
Montana, for example, has issued GO bonds to meet its CWSRF match; the GO bonds are repaid
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with interest earnings on SRF loans and are further secured by the full faith and credit of the state
(EPA, 2018). While GO bonds are subject to limits on total debt outstanding and often require
voter approval prior to issuance, revenue bonds are neither subject to these voter approval
requirements nor to debt limits/caps (Tax Policy Center, 2021). In addition, revenue bonds often
offer a higher coupon rate than GO bonds; this means that the investors are willing to take some
risks in exchange for a higher return (Hyun, Nishizawa & Yoshino, 2008).
In the literature, debt capacity and debt affordability both measure the ability to borrow,
and they are similarly defined and often used interchangeably. However, the two concepts have a
slightly different emphasis at times. Debt capacity focuses more on the total amount of
outstanding debt relative to the total economic base or to relative current revenue, whereas debt
affordability emphasizes the burden associated with repaying the debt (Kriz & Wang, 2012).
Denison et al. (2006) contend that the term “debt capacity” has to do with a state’s ability to
sustain debt in the long run or, similarly, the level of debt that can be supported without
imposing undue budgetary constraints on other desired state programs and expenditures (Ramsey
& Hackbart, 1996).
Alternatively seen, debt capacity is “the amount of financing that can be issued by the
state within legal constraints without overextending the state’s ability to pay its obligation”
(Hildreth, 2005, p. 17). The concept of debt affordability refers to a state’s ability to repay all of
its obligations without negatively impacting the provision of ongoing public services or raising
taxes to anticompetitive levels (Hildreth, 2005). Accordingly, in order to answer the debt
affordability question, the established models should primarily consider the uncertain future of
revenue and expenditure and other relevant factors related to the nature of revenue resources;
political and legal factors should not be of primary concern (Bartle, Kriz, & Wang, 2008).
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Furthermore, Denison et al. (2006) suggested that there is no one-size-fits-all capacity. Instead,
it may be more appropriate to employ multiple debt capacities due to the varying volatility of the
different types of municipal bonds. Finally, state governments consider debt affordability a key
concept because of its potential implications for state borrowing costs and impacts on the
government’s long-term fiscal sustainability. The borrowing cost and the debt service may also
rise as debt burdens rise. As the debt service requirement accounts for a significant portion, the
available funding for services will likely be squeezed accordingly (Weiner, 2013).
Measurement of State Debt Affordability
Bartle, Kriz, and Wang (2008) and Kriz and Wang (2012) provided a comprehensive
review of current debt affordability models accompanied by a brief description of each method,
examples, states that have adopted the method, and a short discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses for each method. Traditionally, debt affordability has been estimated by one or more
of the following three methods: debt ceiling, benchmarking, and the regression approach. The
debt ceiling, or self-comparison approach, compares a jurisdiction’s debt level to a single value
or multiple values of the measure itself. There are three sub-methodologies for the debt ceiling:
the simple, the bond-rating-oriented, and the complex approaches. The debt ceiling is a
straightforward and easy-to-implement method. However, it is known to be intuition-based and
arbitrary, since it often ignores many important determinants while setting the ceiling. It is also
known to be static because it does not change when the economic environment changes (Kriz &
Wang, 2012).
A benchmarking approach that is highly recommended by the Government Finance
Officers Association (GFOA) is used to compare a jurisdiction's own debt level to that of others.
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A "bench" can be the national median or the median of a peer group. Selected debt capacity,
such as debt service, is then calculated and compared to the bench. Many states have been using
the debt ceiling (Connecticut, South Carolina, Tennessee, Maryland, Wisconsin, Oregon) and
benchmarking (Virginia, California, New York). About 22 states use the debt-service-to-revenue
ratio to measure their debt affordability. These states set a ceiling for the debt-service-to-revenue
ratios; for instance, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Alaska recommend 8 percent, while it is 18.5
percent in Hawaii by the constitution and 15 percent in Delaware by statute. Weiner (2013)
offered cross-comparative measures of state government debt burdens in New England by using
different affordability ratios. The author presented a comparison of the debt service-to-revenues
ratio and concluded that Connecticut and Massachusetts have among the highest debt burdens,
12.7 and 11.3 respectively, for net tax-supported debt (p. 22). The benchmark approach is
thought to be comparable; however, it is inaccurate and static because of its inherent issues that
no two jurisdictions are perfectly comparable; many factors have been left out, including the
broadness of the tax base, the efficiency of management, and future economic growth (Kriz &
Wang, 2012).
The regression approach is the only empirical method; it comprises two components:
multivariate and time series (Bartle et al., 2008). The specific steps in this approach include
selecting the appropriate estimating equation to explain debt capacity; testing the model's fitness
by using historical data to estimate coefficients; using the time series technique to predict the
future value of independent variables, and then substituting the predicted future values of the
independent variables into the previous equation and calculating the future debt affordability
(Kriz & Wang, 2012, p. 13), with the assumption that the interest rate, the credit rating, and so on
are unchanged (Bartle et al., 2008). Compared to other approaches, regression is a science-based
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and data-supported technique. However, this regression method also has weaknesses. It relies on
assumptions and the fact that some variables are nonquantifiable and some high correlation
problems exist; these issues can lead to multicollinearity issues (Bartle et al., 2008).
Other new models have been introduced: the curve model (Brecher, Richwerger, &
Wagner, 2003), the stochastic simulation model (Kriz, 2010), and the simultaneous equation
model (Wang, 2009). Each model also has pros and cons; for instance, the curve model is not a
causal statistic model. It is complex to explain the result of the stochastic simulation model; the
simultaneous model is only supported by specialized statistical software (Kriz & Wang, 2012).
It has been suggested that a debt analyst can easily use more than one method or can combine
two or more of the three methods; this can help produce more accurate estimates of debt
capacity. For example, the result predicted by the linear regression model can also be compared
with benchmarks (Kriz & Wang, 2012).
To gauge affordability, states and credit rating agencies typically rely on ratios that
compare a state's debt with the resources available for its repayment. These frequently used debt
affordability ratios include debt service to revenue; debt per capita; debt relative to current
revenues; debt-to-value of taxable property; debt-to-personal income; debt service-toexpenditures, and others (Brecher et al., 2003; Robbins & Dungan, 2001; Simonsen, Robbins, &
Brown, 2003; Weiner, 2013). Simonsen et al. (2003) provided definitions of each ratio; for
example, debt service consists of principal and interest payments that the state government
makes every year. Weiner (2013) categorized these ratios into groups that comprise the states
that employ the metric. Among these, the debt service-to-revenues metric is the one most
frequently used by state governments (22 states); it is, arguably, the best indicator of the nearterm affordability of state debt since this metric reflects current costs and policies. Weiner (2013)
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also suggested that no single ratio stands out as the best gauge of debt affordability and notes that
states should consider using multiple metrics: for instance, debt service-to-revenue for the near
term and debt-to-personal income for a longer-term perspective.
Empirical Evidence
Applying a regression approach, Ramsey, Gritz, and Hackbart (1988) further developed a
state debt predicting model that is based on an existing one, using four quantifiable and
important independent variables: revenue, per capita income, population, and the assessed value
of the real property with surveyed data from 1977-1986. The basic estimating equation used to
calculate the debt capacity for Kentucky is:
Y=a+ b1 X1 + b2 X2 + b3 X3 + b4 X4 (1)
Where:
Y= Annual debt service on tax-supported debt
X1= Assessed value of real property (taxable capacity)
X2= State Revenues (Revenue raising capacity)
X3= Per Capita income
X4= Population
The authors tested whether there is a statistically significant relationship between the set
of independent variables and the annual debt service, and then predicted the future value of each
independent variable using an autoregressive estimating procedure. Then, they substituted these
estimated values into the equation to produce a forecast of future debt service levels. The future
debt levels can be estimated based on the debt service level given the existing level of interest.
The regression results indicated a fit model with 𝑅 =0.98, even though X3 was not statistically
significant. The authors acknowledged that multicollinearity may exist among independent
variables but argued for not respecifying the model since these variables were previously
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identified as both appropriate and important variables for state policy and budget decisionmakers in identifying the level of debt capacity that can be afforded (Ramsey et al., 1988, p.
233). In addition, they also argued that the interrelation among independent variables that existed
in the past may continue to hold in the future; since the purpose of the model is to predict the
future value, the multicollinearity that exists does not harm the predictive ability of the model.
The empirical results indicated that multicollinearity did exist, as noted by the negative signs for
X2 and X3; X3 was not statistically significant. In addition, it is recognized that many variables
that impact debt capacity are difficult to quantify and to model, such as state debt management
practices, capital budgeting procedures, and divisions of state and local responsibilities.
Other empirical studies offer a variety of factors that impact debt affordability. Besides
the assessed value of the taxable property, Bahl and Duncombe (1993) also included federal
grants to state government, personal income, and tax capacity into the measurement of a state's
ability to cover its debt service obligations. Furthermore, interest rate and borrowing cost are also
essential factors in determining the overall fiscal burden. The state government borrows millions
of dollars, and any variation in interest rates substantially impacts interest payment (Levine,
2011). Thus, high-interest rates discourage bond sales. Empirical evidence suggests that the
interest rate has a statically significant adverse effect on the level of debt (Clinger, Feiock,
McCabe, & Park, 2008; Clingermayer & Wood, 1995).
Rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody's, and Standard & Poor's usually examine four
factors: economic condition, financial condition, debt position, and administrative factors, in
order to determine the bond rating. States and local governments often imitate these models to
estimate their debt capacity. States and local governments employ modifications to serve their
own governmental perspective, which is different from that of the rating agencies (Kriz & Wang,
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2012). Accordingly, the literature on state debt affordability focuses on identifying income and
wealth variables that are reasonable proxy measures. For instance, among the rating criteria for
Fitch's water and sewer revenue bonds for 2018, coverage and financial performance criteria
include various quantitative ratios, such as pledged revenues, growth in operating revenues and
expenditures, reserve funding, weather-related demand, and economic cycles (Fitch Ratings,
2017).
Concerning a Specific Infrastructure Fund
Denison et al. (2006) conducted a review of road fund (special revenue fund) debt policy
and provided a comparison of the debt service ratio between a statewide general fund and a
specific road fund. From 1990 to 2000, the average debt service expenditures relative to total
General Fund revenues tended to remain at 3-4 percent, with the lowest calculated mean ratio
value occurring in 1992 with a debt service ratio of 2.8 percent. The highest mean debt service
ratio was observed in 1997 at 3.6 percent. The ratios of Road Fund debt service to total Road
Fund revenues for the period exceeded the observed average of the General Fund (around 10
percent). The debt service ratio of the Road Fund is higher because Road Fund revenues are
principally used for infrastructure financing, while the General Fund principally funds operating
budgets. The Road Fund can also support more debt due to its relatively stable revenues
(earmarked resources and the inelasticity of Road Fund revenue sources). Also, mean debt
service to Road Fund revenue ratios varies greatly among states (with the highest states in the
16.7-21.6 percent range and the lowest states in the 1.6–3.2 percent range). Such stratification
likely reflects a credit risk as well as different states’ preferences to use debt financing (p.34).
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In their regression model, Denison et al. (2006) included the Road Fund debt limit as
explanatory variables and toll revenue, federal highway trust fund transfer, road-related tax
revenue, personal income, population density, and others as control variables. The result implies
that states with a Road Fund debt limit tend to have a higher debt service as a portion of revenue,
by 6.8 percent, as compared with states without a Road Fund debt limit. The states with Road
Fund debt limits have about $17 more debt service per capita when compared to states without
the debt limits. The debt service-to-Road Fund revenue ratio and the debt service-to-Road Fund
per population are also statistically significant, along with state personal income, population
density, and road-related tax revenue.
For wastewater capital projects, (Bartle et al., 2008) reviewed the literature and states’
practices in assessing the affordability of large capital projects through the case of the Combined
Sewer Systems in Nebraska, which were financed by revenue bonds. The authors developed a
financial simulation model that captures the likelihood of the city of Omaha’s overburdening by
projecting residential indicators (expenditures as a percentage of income), which is a commonly
accepted metric for wastewater treatment programs in the EPA analysis. However, this is just
exploratory research, and the conclusion should be viewed as leading to hypotheses that can be
tested later, using systematic methods. Particularly for CWSRF, Holcombe (1992) also
developed leveraged and inflation models to predict the future balance of the revolving fund.
The SRF fund management handbook also recommends models and tools for calculating
leveraging. These include cash flow modeling, the SRF financial planning model (spreadsheet or
software), trend analysis, and analysis of financial metrics. The cash flow model has been
developed by underwriters, financial advisors, and the EPA. It identifies all cash flows associated
with CWSRF and analyzes whether program demand and cash flow needs exceed the current
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available fundings; if so, leveraging is necessary. Cash flow modeling can run scenarios to
consider how the state capacity would change without federal capitalization, or an increased
interest rate, or increased leveraging. Other financial indicators such as operating net and net
interest margin, trend indicators such as executed loans as a percent of funds available, and debt
indicators such as debt service coverage ratio and debt-to-net position can be used in
combination with cash flow modeling. All indicators together help to inform whether a state is
leveraging appropriately (EPA, 2018, p. 46). States usually utilize consultants to evaluate their
leveraging decisions. For instance, Alabama, which began to leverage its CWSRF program in
1990, asked the EPA, with the help of a consultant, to evaluate whether it should continue to
leverage, using the SRF financial planning model. As a result, Alabama decision-makers were
recommended to discontinue leveraging in 2006 (EPA, 2018).
Model Specification
The terms “debt capacity” and “debt affordability,” in the context of CWSRF, are also
used interchangeably, and they refer to the state’s ability to afford a greater level of leveraging
without negatively impacting the funding available for loan assistance (since a debt service
payment will curtail funding available for loan assistance), the SRF’s sustainability, the state’s
water credit ratings, and any borrowing costs. Following the literature on the debt affordability of
tax-supported bonds, this study aims to expand this to apply it to the bonds of CWSRF.
Replicating the regression methodology employed by Ramsey et al. (1988), this essay proposes a
model to estimate debt affordability for CWSRF as follows:
Y=a+ b1 X1 + b2 X2 + b3 X3 + b4 X4 (1)
Where:
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Y= Annual debt service payment
X1= Operating revenue (CWSRF revenues)
X2= Federal and State capitalization (non-operating revenue)
X3= Per capita income
X4= Population density
Annual debt service payment is the total of principal repayment and interest bond
repayment. CWSRF revenue includes operating revenue (interest on investment and interest on
loans and others) and non-operating revenue (federal and state contributions) (EPA, 2016). In
this model, instead of using the assessed value of the real property as the measure of taxable
capacity, the federal and state contribution is used as a measure of the tax-related component,
and the operating revenue serves as the proxy for CWSRF revenue rising capacity. Per capita
personal income is also used as a proxy for the availability of tax (Denison et al., 2006) and state
wealth in the previous literature.
In addition to this replicated model, a similar process is performed to estimate the annual
debt service levels using another set of internal CWSRF financial-based factors for comparison.
As noted, most CWSRF bonds are revenue bonds that are backed not by taxes but by CWSRF
itself. These bonds also do not require voter approval, and the revenues that CWSRF generates
should be sufficient to pay off the debt service. Thus, per capita income and population density
may not be relevant to CWSRF’s debt service as much as to the general fund debt service. In the
adjusted model, X1 and X2 remain the same operating revenues and federal and state
capitalization. Income and population density variables are being replaced by the loan principal
repayment and weighted average interest rate on loans (WAIRL). Since CWSRF’s main activity
is offering loans to local governments and communities, principal repayment seems to be the
largest component of CWSRF’s assets. The fast and efficient circulation of loan repayment
would result in massive inflows of cash and more income, which would support debt service
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repayment. Similarly, the higher loan interest charged would also bring in more interest income
for CWSRF. These two are treated as internal revenue-raising proxies for annual debt service.
Research Method and Data
Using financial historical data from NIMS (Y, X1, and X2) and data from the Census and
Economic Analysis Bureaus (X4 and X5), this essay investigates whether the annual debt service
has a significant relationship with the four factors listed in Equation 1. Later, it uses the Auto
Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model in Stata for time series analysis to
project the future value of each independent variable, which is then substituted into Equation (1)
to forecast debt service levels. The model can then be tested for any state that uses leveraging in
CWSRFs. Among the CWSRFs found to be the most aggressive in leveraging are Connecticut,
Colorado, Massachusetts, New York, Michigan, and Indiana; this essay uses New York data
from 1990 to 2019 and attempts to estimate the future annual debt service levels for 2020-2030.
ARIMA, the Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average, is used to predict the future
value for time series independent variables of equation (1). Box and Jenkins (1976) introduced
the three-step method to select the appropriate ARIMA models. The ARIMA (p, d, q), in which p
is the autoregressive lags, d is the order of the integrated series or the number of nonseasonal
difference needed for stationarity, and q is moving average lags. The three steps consist of
identification, estimation, and diagnostic testing (Box & Jenkins, 1976). In the first stage, several
tests, such as graphs, correlograms, and formal tests (the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests)
are conducted to decide whether the variable is stationary (if the mean and covariance of the
series do not depend on time) and, thus, to decide the appropriate d. Then, correlograms are
employed to determine p and q. The partial autocorrelation function (PACF) test is employed to
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determine the p, the autoregressive lags. The autocorrelation function (ACF) test is used to
determine the q the moving average lags. The outcome of these tests may indicate several
possible candidate models. However, it is recommended to rely on the “parsimony”; this
explains the trade-offs between adding more variables, which leads to an increase in model fit
(R-squared) at the cost of decreasing the degrees of freedom to decide the most appropriate
model. In other words, it is recommended that the model with smallest number of parameters to
be estimated should be the one chosen (Deka & Resatoglu, 2019).
The second stage, estimation, decides which model is better, among all of the possible
models, by considering the significance of ARMA components, the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian
(BIC) criterions, the maximum likelihood, and the estimate of error variance (sigma value)
(Mohamed, 2020). The choice is given to the model with the higher significance of constant, AR
and MA, the smaller sigma value, the greater log likelihood value and the smaller AIC and BIC.
The third stage involves checking whether the selected model satisfying the requirement for a
stable univariate process. The tests include the Portmanteau test with a null hypothesis that the
estimated residual of the model is white noise, as well as other tests to confirm whether the
estimated ARMA process is stationary (the AR roots lie inside the unit circle and the
correlogram is flat) and whether the estimated ARMA process is invertible (the MA roots lie
inside the unit circle and the correlogram is flat) (Box & Jenkins, 1976). If the conditions are
met, the final stage is to forecast the model. If that is not the case, the selection and estimation
will be repeated, in order to find another potential model (Box & Jenkins, 1976).
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Results and Discussions
Descriptive Analysis
For descriptive purposes, this essay calculated the debt service ratio of leveraged
CWSRFs and compared it with previously documented ratios of state General Funds, as well as
Road Funds, as reported by Denison et al. (2006). For CWSRF, the debt service includes
leveraged bond principal repayment (NIMS 211), match bond principal repayment (NIMS 224),
and bond interest paid (NIMS 228). The revenues include non-operating revenue: the federal
contribution (NIMS 74), the annual state match (contribution) (NIMS 76), and the operating
revenues: loan interest (NIMS 235) and interest earning on investment (NIMS 241). On average,
for all leveraged states during the study period, the mean debt service ratio was 52.7 percent,
which is much higher than the ceiling range (around a ten percent rule) for general state finance.
For instance, the actual debt service-to-revenue ratio of the state General Fund ranged within 3-4
percent during 1990-2000, and that of Road Fund was around 10 percent. As pointed out by
Denison et al. (2006), the debt service ratio of the Road Fund is higher because Road Fund
revenues are used for infrastructure financing, whereas the General Fund revenues are for
operating purposes. In addition, Road Funds have stable revenue from earmarked resources, as
well as toll and fee revenues, which explains why Road Funds can have more debt than a
General Fund. In a similar approach, there are reasons explaining why CWSRFs have higher
debt, as compared to others. CWSRFs also have large non-operating revenues from federal and
state governments, in addition to stable operating revenues. CWSRF can set aside a reserve from
federal capitalization as collateral for borrowing; this facilitates the bond issuing process and
helps CWSRF borrow faster and easier. In addition, CWSRFs are allowed to borrow for state-
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match, which is not the case in Road Fund. As a result, CWSRF has much higher leveraging, as
well as the debt service-to-revenue ratio, than the Road Fund.
Figure 4.1 presents the average debt service-to-revenue ratio by state. Consistent with
previous essays, states with a higher leveraged profile also had a higher debt service ratio
(Connecticut, Colorado, Minnesota, Arizona, and Rhode Island), with an average ratio of more
than 100 percent.
Figure 4.1
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These extremely high ratios signal an alarm that all of the revenues of these aggressively
leveraged CWSRFs are just enough to pay back the debt service. Paying for such a tremendous
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debt service curtails many financial resources dedicated to repaying bond interests, making it
challenging for CWSRF to meet other loan assistance priorities or extend its activities. This also
calls to mind the concern over the sustainability of the CWSRF, especially when the federal
government discontinues the annual contribution. Also, the mean debt service-to-CWSRF
revenue ratios vary significantly among states, as expected (with the highest states in the 100119 percent range and the lowest states in the 2–10 percent range), likely due to the states’
diversity of debt treatment and their preferences to use debt financing.
The mean annual debt service ratio shown in Figure 4.2 presents a zigzag uptrend starting
from 2 percent in 1990 and reaching a peak of 98 percent in 2017. It declined to 83 percent in
2018 and to 77 percent in 2019. This recent decreasing tendency seems to consistently
correspond to the decreasing trend of total debt ratio noted in Chapter Two; however, it shows
some delay in time.
Figure 4.2
Mean Annual Debt Service to Revenues
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Empirical Results
Table 4.1
Regression Results of Annual Debt Service Model
Adjusted Model

Replicated Model
Model
Residual
Number of Obs.
F(4, 25)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared

8.4236e+17
1.1071e+16
30
475.54
0.0000
0.987
0.985
Coefficient
t
Constant
-692000000***
-4.4
Revenue
1.178408***
9.59
Capitalization
0.0098445
0.35
Income
-5065.537**
-2.29
POPDEN
5817141***
3.81
Note. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Constant
Revenue
Capitalization
Prin. Rep.
WAILR

8.3944e+17
1.3993e+16
30
374.93
0.0000
0.9836
0.9810
Coefficient
t
79500000*
1.84
1.305788***
13.27
0.0766178**
2.34
0.2988408***
3.43
-26000000**
-2.55

For calculating purposes, the annual debt service amount was used, instead of the ratio.
For the replicated model, the multiple regression results shown in Table 4.1 indicate a fit model
with 𝑅 = 0.98 and F=475.54. Thus, the model can be used to predict the future debt levels.
Equation (1) was estimated using New York data for the time period from 1990-2019. The
results are shown in the equation below.
Y=-692,000,000+1.178408 X1 +0.0098445X2 -5065.537X3 +5817141X4 (1)
Similar to the Ramsey et al. (1988) model, this CWSRF model also encountered a
multicollinearity problem, as expected (high variance inflation factor -VIF score for per capita
income and population density). Federal and State capitalization was found not to be significant.
According to Ramsey et al. (1988), despite the insignificant independent variable, for predicting
purposes, the model can still be used because this set of variables has been previously identified
as appropriate for state policy makers in deciding that the debt capacity. Also, the presence of
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multicollinearity (that holds in the past as well as in the future) would not affect the predicting
power of the model.

For the adjusted model, the regression results in Table 4.1 also indicated a fit model with
𝑅 = 0.98 and F=374.93. This model appeared to be less subject to the multicollinearity issue
(mean VIF 4.3) and all four independent variables were significant. Thus, the model can also be
used to predict the future debt levels. Equation (2) was estimated using New York data for the
time period 1990-2019. The results are shown in the equation below.
𝑌=79,500,000+1.305788X1 +0.0766178X2 +0.2988408X3 -26000000X4 (2)
Table 4.2 presents the results of the ARIMA three-stage process including all
independents for both replicated model and adjusted model: the selected ARIMA model of
operating revenue (X1), Federal and State capitalization (X2), per capita personal income (X3),
and population density (X4), loan principal repayment, and the weighted average rate on loans.
These selected ARIMA models are believed to most accurately describe the trend of each
independent variable (X) and they, accordingly, provide the greatest accuracy in forecasting.
Each model choice, in accordance with the procedure set out in the method section, involves
judgments of evaluating indicators, as well as post test results, with the aim of creating a
parsimonious model. Among the six selected models in Table 4.2, the ARIMA (0,1,0) of the
principal repayment variable is a special type known as a random walk model. “This model
assumes that in each period the variable takes a random step away from its previous value, and
the steps are independently and identically distributed in size” (Nau, 2014, p. 1). The forecast
value of this model is usually flat and equal to the last observation (Nau, 2014). Population
density variable is only stationary at the second difference.
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Table 4.2
Selected ARIMA Models
Operating
Capitalization
Revenues

Per
capita
personal
income

Pop.
Principal
Density Repayment

WAILR

Model
212
310
111
320
010
111
No. of Obs.
29
29
29
28
29
29
Significance
4/5
3/4
1/3
2/4
1/1
1/3
Sigma
20300000
150000000 1025.294 0.353547
42100000 0.4303811
Log likelihood
-530.8047
-587.8357 -242.3705 -11.17635
-550.2457 -16.88433
Akaike (AIC)
1071.609
1185.671 492.7411 32.35271
1104.491 41.76866
Bayeseian (BIC) 1078.446
1192.508 498.2103 39.01373
1107.226 47.23785
Portmanteau test
(Q) statistic
4.0214
11.3622
4.9781
7.0584
10.782
8.9542
Prob.
0.983
0.4982
0.9587
0.8537
0.5477
0.7068
AR parameters
0.850867
0.821726
0.07043
0.850823
0.23199
MA parameters
0.999992
0.48676
0.37105
Note.
Portmanteau test: if p>0.05 cannot reject the null hypothesis then residuals are white noise.
AR/MA roots (-1 to 1): AR/MA parameters satisfy stability/inversibility conditions

Using the selected ARIMA models, the essay produced the predicted values of each
independent variables for the main model, which then were substituted into Equation (1) and
Equation (2) to forecast the debt service level that can be afforded for the CWSRF of New York
for next ten years. Equation (1) and Equation (2) then give the following results in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 shows that the predicted values of annual debt service drawn from replicated
model were relatively smaller than the series of predicted values of the adjusted model, although
the difference was not significant. The greater amount of predicted value implies a greater
affordability of CWSRF’s debt service level. The replicated set of independent variables
appeared to be more suitable with general state finance because debt service payment is backed
by taxes for their issued GO bonds. While the majority of CWSRF’s issued bonds are revenue
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bonds which are backed by the income from the CWSRF itself, the adjusted model may produce
more relevant predicted annual debt services.
Table 4.3
Predicted New Debt Service
New Debt Service Affordable ($)
Year
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029

Replicated Model
496,670,279
508,027,451
525,444,196
541,592,807
556,810,125
571,945,678
588,220,423
601,974,460
614,015,175
627,975,506

Adjusted Model
511,606,494
516,900,703
550,302,428
575,284,284
583,736,219
602,041,161
628,786,277
645,942,190
657,049,891
676,657,763

Thus, both models predicted that New York’s CWSRF can incur new debt during the
next ten years with a debt service; this is presented in Table 4.3. Most importantly, the New York
CWSRF can expect to be able to repay such a debt service amount without crowding other loan
assistance or activities and without risking its current credit rating. With a given interest rate on
debt, the total principal amount of debt for New York’s CWSRF can be estimated. As noted
earlier, since the regression approach is the only empirical method to assess debt affordability
besides debt ceiling and benchmarking, these predicted values can be a good source of reference
for the state revolving fund managers. For instance, compared with the most current debt service
amount in 2019 ($496,355,382), the higher predicted values of annual debt service may imply
that New York’s CWSRF may still have room for more affordable leveraging.
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However, the gap is minimal, suggesting that New York will reach its maximum
affordability level soon. This is consistent with the fact that New York’s CWSRF has a high
mean debt service-to-revenue ratio (93 percent), which signals a need for careful consideration
for additional leveraging. Nevertheless, with the recently passed bill of infrastructure, in the
coming years, billions of dollars will inflow into the SRFs. CWSRFs will expect a larger scale of
federal appropriation, which will increase their expected total of assets accordingly. This means
that states (for instance, New York) will have a greater ability to incur new debt because nonoperating revenue (federal grants) will be so much higher.
Conclusion
Borrowing the set of identified predictors for debt capacity, including tax capacity and
revenue rising components, per capita income and population from state debt affordability
literature, this essay built an estimation equation to explain the annual debt service of CWSRF.
An adjusted model with specific indicators relevant to CWSRF was also constructed.
Considering the specific characteristics of CWSRF that offer loans to local governments and
communities and considering that loan repayment is the most significant inflow of resources, this
model treats loan repayment as a proxy for revenue in the adjusted model. Replicating the
regression method employed by Ramsey et al. (1988), this essay performed two component tests.
First, the multivariate regression was used to test the fitness of the CWSRF debt service model
and to identify the respective coefficients of the equation (1). In the second step, the ARIMA
model with historical time series data was used to predict the future value of the respective
independent variables. The predicted values from the second step were then substituted in the
equation in the first step to produce the estimated debt service, with the assumption that interest
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rate, credit rate, and so on remained unchanged. The statistical models presented here indicate
the amount of debt service a state can incur.
The predicted results of both models were relatively greater than the current values,
suggesting that the New York CWSRF can afford a slightly higher level of leveraging in the near
future. However, the difference is not significant; coupled with the high debt service-to-revenue
ratio, it is recommended that the New York CWSRF carefully consider any additional
leveraging. While New York is selected as an example of a moderately aggressive leveraging
state, the practice can be performed for other leveraged states. This essay chose to predict annual
debt service, which is intended for near-term affordability. The total debt, for a long-term
perspective, can be also predicted. It should be noted that, because each state has a different time
series, the ARIMA candidate model for each independent variable will be, accordingly, changed.
Also, in general, different states have different debt policies and/or debt priorities. While the
regression approach can be applicable to every leveraged state, the predicted value of debt
service is for the state’s own reference to decide on an affordable debt level, rather than for a
comparison between states.
It is noted that the regression approach is known as the science based and data supported
method, a useful tool for predicting the future value of a debt level. However, the more important
issue is to decide which relevant set of independent variables should be used to reflect the debt
level most accurately. The internal financial-based set of independent variables appears to
provide a more relevant prediction of CWSRF’s debt. Since the literature also indicates the
limitations of the regression method, it is recommended to use the results of this regression
approach in combination with different methods, such as the benchmark and ceiling as indicated
in the literature, and especially the cash flow model currently recommended in the SRF Financial
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Management Handbook, as well as other indicators, to decide on the acceptable debt
affordability levels of CWSRF.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Dissertation Summary
The Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) is an innovative financing mechanism
created in order to bridge the public infrastructure financing gap. It is known as a capitalized
state loan program that was introduced in addition to traditional block grants. At the same time,
its birth is also the result of Congress’s intent to reduce the role of the national government,
while providing more control and more discretion to states in their water quality funding (Morris,
2022). Given the uniqueness of this state-run entity, its operation and performance are essential
for administrators and policymakers. This study’s purpose is to examine the debt financing
decision of CWSRF: whether or not, and to what extent, states should leverage or use debt
financing to meet their goals of providing assistance loans for local community wastewater
infrastructure. This dissertation contains three essays that address three unique topics related to
the motivations that underlie states’ choices of debt financing and how they manage their debt
affordability during the first three decades of operation. This research has five chapters: the
introduction chapter, three main essays, and a conclusion chapter. The study period covers three
decades from 1990 to 2019 (the two first years were eliminated because the program was not yet
fully operational). Most of the data used in this dissertation comes from the National Information
Management System database, collected and managed by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). The following is a summary of the three main content chapters.
Chapter Two examines the relationship between a set of internal financial indicators and
leverage ratios (total leveraging and new leverage) from 1990 through 2019. Considering
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CWSRF as an enterprise fund that is operated as a private business enterprise, the chapter
constructs CWSRF’s leveraging model based on the assumptions of pecking order theory. It then
tests whether the entity’s total assets, the growth of total assets, the operating net ratio, the debt
service reserve ratio, and the volatility of operating net change (risk) and others would influence
the capital structure of CWSRFs.
Descriptive analysis results indicate that leverage in the CWSRF is relatively low to
moderate. The mean value of the total leverage for the entire sample is about 20 percent, and the
average new leverage is about 3 percent. Two ratios are higher, at 27.1 percent and 4.2 percent,
for leveraged states only. As expected, these ratios obscure significant variations among states.
The ten most aggressive leveraging states have total leveraging at about 50 percent; on the
opposite side, the average total leveraging is less than 10 percent. The zero ratios belong to those
states that are only leveraged for meeting state-match purposes. Such a state-match amount of
bonds issued is then repaid within the year. Over thirty years, the mean annual total leverage
maintained the highest rate during the second decade (2002-2012) at about 30 percent; however,
it has tended to decline in recent years, reaching 23.8 percent in 2019. The empirical findings
suggest that the size (log of total assets), the growth (change in total assets), and the federal
return on investment (FROI) are relevant predictors of CWSRF leveraging. Larger and
expanding CWSRFs tend to issue more new bonds and maintain a high level of outstanding debt.
On the contrary, small and slower-growing states are likely less to be dependent on leveraging.
FROI is found to be negatively related to the total leverage; this suggests that states with high
utilization of federal seed money tend to maintain a lower level of outstanding debt. The findings
are mixed regarding the pecking order theory’s assumptions, but they are consistent with
previous studies that use more than one theory to estimate capital structure determinants.

107
Chapter Three analyzes the external factors that determine the debt financing decisions of
CWSRFs. Following the voter median theory and empirical studies from the literature on state
financing, this chapter constructs a leverage model that consists of three groups of independent
factors: socioeconomic factors, political factors, and institutional factors. The proxies for
leveraging are measured by debt as a percentage of loan assistance and new debt per capita. The
descriptive analysis reveals that, on the average, CWSRF’s debt accounts for 28 percent of its
funding for loan assistance, annually. That share percentage also significantly varies among
states. In some states, the debt covers more than 80 percent, while, for other states, the debt share
ratio ranges from 0.5 to 15 percent. Over the years, debt share and debt per capital illustrate a
similar unstable zigzag trendline, with a peak in 2004 and the lowest point in 2014. It must be
noted that CWSRFs received a substantial amount of federal appropriation right before and
during the Great Recession (2010), not including the $2 billion from American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. Thus, states had sufficient funding to support loan assistance, even during the
recession. The regression results show a strong connection between historic outstanding debt (a
proxy for debt capacity) with both debt ratios suggesting that states used to high leverage will
continue to do it in the future. On the other hand, the empirical findings indicate a limited
association between other external factors and debt share and debt per capita. The federal share
of loan assistance, an election year, and environmental needs are each found to have a
relationship with the debt share, whereas the income and the House being controlled by
Democrats (HDEM) variables are identified as relevant predictors of debt per capita. The
findings show a weak connection to the assumptions of median voter theory and to other factors
in the state financing literature.
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Unlike Chapters Two and Three, which include all 50 states into analysis, Chapter Four
focuses on only 36 leveraged states. It reviews the state debt affordability literature and then uses
the regression method to calculate the predicted value of the annual debt service of CWSRF.
Debt service-to-revenue is identified as the most popularly used ratio among the states for
measuring debt capacity. The regression method is also known as the science-based and datasupported technique for predicting future debt levels. Replicating Ramsey et al. (1988)’s
equation and regression method, this chapter predicts the future value of the debt service of the
New York’s CWSRF. The average debt service-to-revenue ratio of CWSRF ranges from 2
percent to 123 percent, which appears to be relatively high compared to that of General Finance
or of Road Funds (at around ten percent). The nature of CWSRF – using federal appropriation as
a reserve for bond issuance, targeting to increase the utilization of such seed money, and acting
as an environmental infrastructure bank to meet the huge wastewater infrastructure needs from
the communities – makes it easier to borrow money; that explains why CWSRF has a higher
level of leverage than Road Funds. The predicted value of New York’s future annual debt service
level appears to be both relevant and valuable for reference, suggesting that the regression
method is a relevant debt affordability predicting tool for other CWSRFs.
Contribution and Significance
This research arrives right on time. Despite over thirty years of operation, limited
research pertaining to CWSRF’s leveraging has been documented. As indicated previously,
leveraging has been and will be the essential component of CWSRF, since it cumulatively
contributes around half the amount to the CWSRF pool of funds; it is now time to review their
debt financing behavior, their debt management practices, and the way in which those behaviors
and those practices influence the program’s performance and sustainability. More importantly,
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vast inflows of dollars from the recently passed infrastructure bill will channel into both the
CWSRF and the DWSRF in the years to come. Thus, the results of this study will have some
practical implications for future research, as well as for the long-term viability of the SRF model.
Implication for Research
This study extends a private sector theory – the pecking order theory – to the public
sector, and it is the first piece to focus on the capital structure of a state-run entity. By
highlighting the capital structure patterns and trends of CWSRF and the determinants of CWSRF
leveraging, the study enriches the literature on not-for-profit organizations' capital structure. The
empirical evidence shows that the pecking order theory is applicable to a quasi-public/public
entity. It can be combined with other theories, such as trade-off theory, to predict the debt
financing behavior for those "enterprise funds" such as CWSRFs. This study can be replicated
for the Drinking Water Revolving Fund and other increasing numbers of SRFs.
Simultaneously, this study establishes the first empirical evidence regarding this
particular SRF innovative financing mechanism and its leveraging. CWSRF or SRF is a unique
organizational setting that reflects the crosscutting of government mandates, infrastructure
financing, business-like operating, and infrastructure banking business. Examining CWSRF
through different lenses of respective literature draws a closer picture of CWSRF’s leveraging.
CWSRF tends to have a lower leveraging profile, when compared with the private sector.
However, CWSRF seems to have a much higher leveraging and debt service-to-revenue ratio
than general state finance and highway infrastructure. The leveraging motivation is also
different. CWSRF appears to be less associated with state politics, socioeconomic factors, TELs,
and debt limits, but more related to financial factors. CWSRF also has its own identification,
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such as a change in federal appropriation that would encourage more leveraging for state match
in CWSRF. This positive relationship is different from the often-found negative relationship in
previous studies. More research into SRF, such as the Drinking Water SRF, state infrastructure
banks, and other similar revolving funds would be beneficial, in order to gain better insights into
these differences and to build up the literature for these SRF-niched areas.
Lastly, this study extends the regression method to predict the debt affordability from the
general debt finance to CWSRF. The replicated and adjusted models provide relevant and
valuable predicted values of the annual debt service for CWSRFs. The study, therefore, supports
the contention that this method can be used to estimate debt affordability in the revolving fund
setting. In addition, this dissertation also supports the claims from previous studies that no single
theory or method can exclusively explain leveraging/financing behavior or debt affordability
decisions. Thus, a combination of more than one theory or method should be employed, when
researching CWSRF’s leveraging.
Implication for Policymakers
Leveraging decisions exert influences differently on different groups of states. This
study’s findings indicate that states that are small and growing more slowly appear to use less
leverage. The reasons associated with that may include their own constraints (such as credit
rating and debt managing capacity) as well as other external challenges. These states may be
starved for more financial resources, and they likely intend to issue bonds to meet such needs,
but they may not yet be able to do that. The EPA should consider further favorable treatments
such as, but not limited to, subsidies in order to encourage these states to access the bond
issuance. At the same time, the group of larger and faster-growing states which tend to issue
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more bonds may encounter the pressure of high debt service repayment and should pay more
attention to their debt affordability management.
As the EPA points out in its audit report and its Financial Management Handbook, the
policy that allows states to use bonds to meet state match requirements obviously reduces the
funding available for water projects. By 2007, it was reported that current borrowing for a statematch caused an estimated $937 million to be less available for loans since the inception of the
SRF program (both CWSRF and DWSRF) (EPA, 2007). This practice may trigger other states
which have issued GO bonds that retire from state general funds to potentially transfer to retiring
their bonds from SRFs, significantly reducing the amount of funds available for future projects.
Due to the expectation of Congress that the CWSRF funds would continue to grow into
perpetuity, the Inspector General has recommended that the EPA revise its regulations on state
matches and no longer allow states to use bonds repaid from CWSRF to meet state match
requirements.
This dissertation provides some evidence that supports these negative impacts of
allowing states to issue bonds to meet the state match requirement. From a private sector
perspective, the capital structure of CWSRF can be considered a low leveraged profile (27.1
percent for leveraged states) on average, as seen in Chapter Two. However, the debt affordability
level of these CWSRFs (mean debt service-to-revenue 52.7%) in Chapter Four seems to be
relatively higher than its leveraged level – the low-profit margin results from a low-interest loan,
which is expected and is widely accepted in CWSRFs. However, the loss incurred due to the
repayment of match bond principal and interest adds another layer to reduce CWSRF’s operating
revenue significantly. As discussed in Chapter Three, if the state match is GO bonds secured by
the general fund, as recommended by the general inspector, the current loss revenue would be
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added back to the operating income. The allocation of the general state budget for the CWSRF
state-match would promote the importance of CWSRF in state budgeting and financing. Despite
the recommendation since 2007, the practice of issuing bonds secured by CWSRF for state
matches continues in 24 states (out of the 36 leveraged states). Continuing this practice would
threaten the sustainability of CWSRFs in the future.
For CWSRF Managers
Each CWSRF may follow its own state regulations or guidance concerning debt
affordability. This practice is widely accepted due to the diversity of the state and its unique tax
and debt treatments. EPA also recommends other models/methods for CWSRF managers to deal
with debt capacity issues. States can also hire external consultants to help with recommendations
on debt affordability level. However, each approach also has associated issues. Hiring a
consultant can be costly, and CWSRF cannot do it often. Debt or cashflow models and methods
can be too complicated for CWSRF staff to handle. The regression method in Chapter Four could
be a good candidate for CWSRF to adopt since it is a viable method that does not require
complicated calculation but produces reliable and relevant predictions because it is a sciencebased and data-supported technique that lets the historical debt-related data of CWSF “tell”
about themselves. This regression method can be a standard tool for leveraged states to predict
affordable debt value. The prediction values of this regression method can be comparable
sources of reference across states.
Directions for Future Research
This dissertation has highlighted some notable results; however, many insights gained
from this study lead to further areas of study. First, this research has brought up the need to
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conduct a qualitative or mixed-method study, perhaps a case study including an interview with
the key finance decision-makers of the CWSRF of three to five states. The choice of state would
take into consideration its size, location, and levels of leveraging. There could be a survey sent to
the CWSRF's managers for collecting information related to both aspects: motivations of
leveraging and debt management practices. The data collected would provide more in-depth and
comprehensive information that would later supplement or validate some of the findings of this
study.
This research is among very few studies related to the SRF innovative financing
mechanism; a replication of this study for the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund and the
State Infrastructure Bank (the highway SRF) would accumulate more evidence on leveraging and
debt management in the SRF setting. In addition, the current leveraged CWSRF model can be
revised to include some more indicators. Bond-rating, issuing cost, sewer user charge as a
percent of Median Household Income (MHI), and poverty data are some potential determinants
of CWSRF's leveraging.
Local demand for CWSRF's loans seems to be a more relevant determinant of leveraging
than environmental needs. It is assumed that local communities have a high demand for loans
similar to their environmental needs, and the CWSRF is actively responding to it. However,
there is little documentation about such loan demand from local communities. States may have
different demands for loans, regardless of their environmental needs. For instance, a state with
substantial environmental needs but little loan demand may not need leverage. On the other
hand, higher demand for loans might convince states that have the capacity to take on greater
debt to meet that demand. Thus, a future study should investigate the local demand for CWSRF's
loans and their impacts on leveraging.
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Finally, public debt receives significant concern at all different levels of government;
however, it is a complex issue. According to The Pew Charitable Trusts, 29 states have done
their debt affordability studies, examining the debt level that those states can prudently take on
(Murphy & Levin, 2017). Thus, this state debt affordability report will likely include an
affordability analysis for CWSRF. The recent 2021 debt affordability study for Rhode Island
treats CWSRF as a quasi-public agency and uses the debt service coverage and the assets-toliabilities ratio. The state recommends that CWSRF maintain a minimum of 1.25 x debt service
cover and a minimum of 1.3 x assets to liabilities (Office of Debt Management, 2021). A further
study focusing on the content analysis of these debt affordability studies gathers a supplemental
and comparable source of reference, in addition to the regression methods described in Chapter
Four.
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APPENDIX A
NIMS Data Code
Table A.1
List of NIMS data code
Code
70

Description
Annual federal capitalization

71

Cumulative Federal capitalization

74

Federal CWSRF Contributions Adjusted for Transfers - Annual

75

Federal CWSRF Contributions Adjusted for Transfers – Cumulative

76

Annual state-match

77

Cumulative state-match

208

Gross Leveraged Bonds Issued - Annual

211

Leveraged Bond Principal Repaid - Annual

212

Debt Service Reserve for Leveraged Bonds annual

213

Debt Service Reserve for Leveraged Bonds - at the end of the reporting period

216

Gross Leveraged Bonds Issued - Cumulative

222

Leveraged Bonds Outstanding - Balance at End of Reporting Period

223

Match Bonds Issued - Annual

224

Match Bond Principal Repaid - Annual

225

Match Bonds issued - Cumulative

227

Match Bonds Outstanding - Balance at End of Reporting

228

Interest Paid from Capitalized Interest Account and Other CWSRF Funds- Annual

230

Interest Paid on Leveraged and Match Bonds - Annual

235

Interest on loans-Annual

240

Weighted Average Interest Rate on Loans

241

Interest Earnings on Investments Annual

307

Federal return on investment-Cumulative

319

Sustainability (Retained earnings) -Cumulative
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Panel Unit Root Tests
Levin-Lin-Chu model (first generation) and Pesaran (2007) model (second generation)
model were used for testing whether variables are stationary. Most first-generation models such
as Levin-Lin-Chu and the Im-Pesaran-Shin test assume cross-sectional independence, which is
not the case for both total leverage and annual/new leverage models. However, the Levin-LinChu (2002) model suggests removing cross-sectional averages from the data to help control such
correlation. LLC is also applicable to datasets with small T (period) and large N. Levin-LinChu’s results in Table A.2 suggest that all variables are stationary at level I(0) except for the total
leverage and reserve, which are stationary at the first difference I(1). The Pesaran CIPS test
results in Table A.2 suggest that all variables are stationary at level except for total leverage,
size, and risk, which are stationary at the first difference I(1). The reserve ratio is not stationary
even after the second difference.
Table A.2
Panel Root Test Results
Levin-Lin-Chu
Variables
Total leverage
New leverage
Profitability
WAIRL
Size
Logsize
Growth
FROI
DRSR

Level I(0)
16.680
-11.367***
-4.355***
-5.851***
-17.579***
-22.993***
-48.929***
-2.847***
2.3365

Risk

-9.252***

Pesaran Panel Unit Root (CIPS)
First difference
I(1)
-9.178***

-7.9671***

Level I(0)
-0.920
-2.737***
-3.414***
-3.844***
-1.128
-3.700***
-6.012***
-3.458***
0.288

First difference I(1)
-2.928***

-2.075

-4.685***

-5.321***

-1.288
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